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INTRODUCTION 
 
Migration flows around the world are incredibly increasing. Many worker expatriates move 
abroad alone or with their families looking for job opportunities; since most of them come 
from very poor areas, those who choose to leave the family in their origin countries send 
home part of their income in order to provide their relatives with economic support. These 
money transfers are known as remittances and, very often, both the remittances’ receivers and 
the national economy rely on those money transfers respectively to cover daily family 
expenses and the national trade deficit. 
Remittances move through financial channels, such as banks, Money Transfer Companies, 
post offices and so on; however, migrants often address to informal financial channels, which 
are quite risky just because of their informality. Conversely from conventional banks, the 
Informal Value Transfer Systems (also known as underground banking, Alternative 
Remittance System, or ethnic banking) allow migrants to easily access financial services 
thanks to their vast network covering also remote areas. On the other hand, unofficial banks 
may be subject to abuses connected to money laundering and terrorism financing activities 
because they are not as regulated as official ones: they agree to use cash without limits and do 
not often even ask for customers’ identification documents, which makes them attractive for 
irregular migrants. Hence, although Alternative Remittance Providers have been historically 
used for licit purposes, regulators have been trying to deter the use of informal channels for 
unlawful purposes since the amount of criminal activities have started increasing. As a result, 
authorities have encouraged formal operators to enter into the remittance market: some of 
them have launched mobile and online banking networks but, except for a few cases (e.g. 
Kenya and the Philippines), they are still far from succeeding as much as wished.  
Recently, Italy has been recording huge migration inflows and banks operating in the country 
have signed partnership with the biggest Money Transfer Companies in order to attract as 
many migrants as possible and discourage the use of unofficial agents to accomplish money 
transfers transactions. Investigations by authorities have however revealed that there are still 
many informal agents operating in the national territory. The Chinese individuals living in 
Italy constitute the foreign community who makes the largest use of underground banks and 
the last investigations revealed that the Chinese often address to informal systems in order to 
carry out money laundering activities rather than remitting part of their income to their 
families. Stricter investigations were therefore put in place and, as a consequence, remittances 
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to China have been shrinking. It is still not clear whether the amount of money sent to China 
has been really decreasing or whether individuals have opted for even more informal 
operators. 
The thesis will describe the role of remittances and underground banks and will link them to 
money laundering issues; it will finally focuses on the money flows from Italy to China. The 
work is divided in five chapters. The first chapter gives a general definition of remittances and 
their main characteristics, as well as a description of their influence on the receivers countries’ 
economy and about the general functioning of Remittance Service Providers. The second 
chapter starts with a short explanation of the European and international payment systems; it 
then reports details on the features of financial channels offering money transfer services and 
lists the characteristics of both formal and informal ones. It also contains a sketch of 
transactions carried out through Remittance Service Providers and explains the main reasons 
making underground banks more attractive than conventional ones. The third chapter 
introduces the concept of money laundering and the main forms of illicit activities related to 
it. I reported a few cases of money laundering through underground banks and the effects they 
have on the real economy. Moreover, I talked about the international regulation in place 
against money laundering and terrorism financing activities and I listed the role of the main 
international bodies. I also analyzed the regulation in place in the United Arab Emirates and 
Afghanistan and I listed their main drawbacks. I finally discussed the opportunities and 
threats faced by formal operators willing to enter the remittance market. In the fourth chapter, 
I started talking about China: I began with a brief outline of the Chinese economy and 
migration flows, and I added an analysis about the amount of remittances inflows in the last 
few years. Finally, in the last chapter, I talked about the most common money laundering 
activities in China and the respective regulation. After having described the Italian money 
laundering regulation and remittance market, I started analyzing the money transfers from 
Italy to China. I first reported the outcome of the last investigations by Italian authorities and I 
tried to demonstrate those results by computing the amount of remittances per Chinese 
individual and by comparing them with the average income declared by the Chinese living in 
Italy. To further confirm the results, I compared China with Pakistan and Morocco, which 
makes it clear that China is an exceptional case.  
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CHAPTER 1: DEFINITION OF REMITTANCES 
AND THEIR ROLE 
 
I. DEFINITION AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF 
REMITTANCES 
 
“Remittance transfers are defined as cross-border person-to-person payments of relatively low 
value”, usually made by migrants sending money to their families still living in their origin 
country (The World Bank, 2007); hence, they are “a portion of the wages of migrant workers 
earned in foreign countries and sent back to their home country” (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). 
The definition of remittance is quite recent: as the worldwide volume of money transfers have 
increased a lot since the 1990s, the G-8 was asked to articulate a description of these flows in 
order to provide guidance to governments willing to identify the phenomenon, its size and its 
effects. (Barajas et al., 2008) 
Estimation of money transfers among countries have highlighted that remittances are a great 
source of financing for receiving countries, exceeding foreign aids and ranking just after 
Foreign Direct Investments.  
In many countries, remittances are the fundamental source of capital for rebalancing the 
balance of trade. Nepal case is emblematic: although its trade deficit has been significantly 
increasing in the last years, it succeeded in turning to a current account surplus thanks to the 
growing amount of remittance inflows (Gaudel, 2006). In fact, the association of the 
demographic increase and a weak economy environment have forced more and more workers 
to move abroad; as a result, money transfers have been raising and they have largely 
contributed to the contraction of the country’s deficit (Wagle, 2012). 
However, the bulk of cash is carried by unofficial channels, so amounts are even higher than 
estimated. Given the huge volumes of these flows, they have been studied to detect their 
impact on the destination countries’ economies, i.e. macroeconomic effects and interactions 
among agents (firms, governments, households, financial intermediaries) (Barajas et al., 
2008). 
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Remittances and Foreign Direct Investments have different characteristics, so their impact on 
the economy is not the same. Just to make some examples, the former are sent in small 
amounts but quite frequently, while the latter are sent occasionally but in great amounts; 
moreover, remittances flows have shown to be quite stable over time, while private capital 
inflows depend on the economic cycle (i.e. they move pro-cyclically). This happens because 
migrants are obviously willing to invest in their countries more than foreign investors are; 
hence “remittances can be viewed as a self-insurance mechanism for developing countries”, 
which is extremely useful in case of natural disasters, wars or state default, because they serve 
as a tool hedging from shocks. It is just because of the stability of remittances over cycles that 
some nations started using them as collateral when borrowing on the international capital 
markets (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: De et al., 2016. 
Source: Data from World Bank World Development indicators and 
IMF Balance of Payments – retrieved from De et al., 2016. 
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The left-side graph demonstrates that, regardless of the set of countries considered, 
remittances are much less volatile than other external financial sources, while the right-side 
graph shows the trend of different financial sources from the 90s onwards. Remittances have 
significantly increased over time and, notwithstanding a slight decline corresponding to the 
beginning of the crisis (probably due to migrants losing their jobs), the chart proves that they 
are much more stable than FDI and portfolio investments. The graph below confirms the 
results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittances flows amounts can be retrieved from the Balance of Payments of single 
countries. Estimations are not straight because they are made up of the sum of personal 
transfers, including all current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals, and 
compensation of employees, which refers to migrants’ wages earned in countries other than 
their homelands. The World Bank has estimated that top sources countries in 2014 were the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Switzerland and Germany, while top recipients were 
such big states as India, China, the Philippines, France and Mexico. Nonetheless, if we 
compare those amounts to the GDP of each country, we find that small nations (Tajikistan, 
Nepal, Moldova) receive more money transfers and are heavily dependent on remittances 
inflows (The World Bank, n.a., a). 
Remittances and Capital inflows during sudden stops 
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Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data 
from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database 
and data releases from central banks, national 
statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. 
 
 
The type of transfers that I am going to analyze later is cash remittances, but migrants may 
choose to make transfers in kind as well. Cash can be transferred both through formal or 
informal channels: the former category includes banks, credit unions and Money Transfer 
Operators (e.g. Western Union, MoneyGram International, Vigo), the latter consists of 
nonbank institutions (Hawala, Hundi, etc) (Yang, n.a.). The world’s largest migration corridor 
is that from Mexico to the US, followed by Russia to Ukraine, Bangladesh to India, and 
Ukraine to Russia (The World Bank, 2015a). 
Migration is a daily-discussed phenomenon and migration flows are massively increasing; as 
a result, remittances are expected to increase as well and policy makers should try to capture 
all the advantages deriving from these transfers. Thanks to globalization, it is very easy to 
move from one place to the other and people are attracted by higher labor demand and income 
levels of other countries: the greater the international labor mobility is, the higher remittance 
ﬂows to poorer countries are (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). Individuals commonly migrate just 
if benefits exceed costs, so economic considerations are fundamental; the wage differential 
between the origin and the destination country constitutes a great economic support for 
migrants’ families (Cai, 2003). Recessions and economic crisis are other factors pushing 
people to migrate; nonetheless, in 2014, some events in Europe reduced migration inflows 
Migrant 
remittance 
inflows (US$ 
million) 
2014 
Share of 
GDP in 
2014 
World 591.968 3,4% 
India 70.389 3,4% 
China 62.332 0,6% 
Philippines 27.273 9,6% 
France 25.195 0,9% 
Mexico 24.462 1,9% 
Nepal 5.770 1,4% 
Tajikistan 3.384 1,7% 
Moldova 2.084 17,9% 
Migrant remittance 
outflows (US$ million) 
2014 
UnitedStates 56.311 
Saudi Arabia 36.924 
Russian Federation 32.640 
Switzerland 24.693 
Germany 20.836 
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and hence remittance volumes to recipient countries. In particular, the tightening of 
immigration controls and the weak recovery of Europe implied a shrink in job opportunities 
for migrants; in addition, the slowdown in Russia made unemployment higher and led to the 
depreciation of its currency, causing a reduction of migrants’ real income. Conversely, in the 
same period, the economic improvements in the US heightened money transfers inflows in 
Latin America and the Caribbean by 5.8%; South-Asian and Sub-Saharan countries recorded 
an increase in remittances as well (The World Bank, 2015a). 
Remittances flows are positively related to the stock of migrants: a deep analysis of the level 
of international money transfers and their drivers is thus essential for setting up adequate 
migration policies aiming at attracting high-skilled immigrants and preventing undesirable 
flows by promoting and supporting economic development in poorer countries (Carling, 
2008). Conversely, the receiving countries should formulate policies pointing to enhance the 
developmental effect of remittances on their economies (Barajas et al., 2008). 
 
II. DETERMINANTS OF REMITTANCES 
 
The migrants’ choice of transferring money home is due to many different factors, which can 
have huge impact both at micro and macro level in their origin country (Bartolini, 2015). 
Incentives and restrictions to remit set up by governments definitely influence the level of 
international money transfers; however, the amount of money which migrants decide to 
transfer depends also on the ties that they have with their families and on whether they are 
going back home in the future (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). If the latter is the case, they send 
money home in order to have some capital in their origin country and to maintain their 
relationships with natives, especially if they are illegal migrants, since their length of stay 
abroad is much more uncertain than for legal ones (Markova and Reilly, 2007). Migrants 
driven by altruistic reasons include the receivers’ level of consumption in their utility 
function, so they transfer money to enhance the standards of living of their relatives and 
smooth their consumption level. The money that they send act then as a buffer hedging from 
negative shocks, i.e. as an insurance (Barajas et al., 2008). 
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Empirical studies on remittance behavior highlighted that men use to remit higher amounts of 
money, but women remit a larger share of their income (Posel, 2001). Obviously, migrants 
moving with their husbands or wives are less likely to send money to their countries (Carling, 
2008). 
Other factors influencing money transfers are the presence of other people coming from the 
same places in the areas where migrants move and the location of receivers. In fact, the 
existence of many immigrants having similar backgrounds translates into better networks 
intended for transferring money but also more intense relationships with the country of origin 
and hence, higher tendency to remit; farther, rural areas are usually poorer than urban ones, so 
migrants coming from those zones are more likely to send money home (Carling, 2008). 
 
III. IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON RECEIVING 
COUNTRIES 
 
Remittances have been deeply investigated by researchers because they can potentially have 
positive effects on the economy of poorer countries. Data on the amount of money transfers, 
origin and receiving countries and ways used for transferring that money are very useful to 
understand the impact that remittances have on the economies of the destination countries. 
The main aim of estimation of these flows is to find out what they are used for. Unfortunately, 
a large portion of money transfers pass through informal channels and even flows passing 
Source: Carling, 2008. 
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through formal channels may not be accurate: some countries require to publish data only if 
money transfers pass a specific threshold; some other may incorporate those flows with other 
ones (e.g. tourism revenues, nonresident deposits) (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). 
Clearly, migrants are able to transfer money only if they manage to find a job in richer 
nations. Contrarily from money arriving through foreign aids, whose target are public entities, 
remittances are meant for households. They positively affect destination countries if they are 
spent in health or education because they help to accrue and improve those nations’ human 
capital; this effect is significant in the long term only if natives receiving education thanks to 
remittances do not in turn migrate (Barajas et al., 2008). Increasing levels of consumptions is 
the consequence most contributing to growth because of its effect in stimulating demand. In 
this case, remittances contribute to soften poverty issues in receiving nations thanks to 
multiplier effects and the reduction of inequalities, which improve the standard of living 
(Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). However, Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003) claimed that 
money transfers may be used as labor income substitutes, causing receivers to reduce their 
labor effort. If these moral hazard issues arise, both firms’ performance and the labor market 
participation rate will shrink. 
Emigrants may be willing to invest the money earned abroad in their origin countries, both to 
build houses and setting up firms. Their investments function as start-up capital that in the 
medium-long term contribute to raise employment opportunities for their families and sustain 
their birthplaces’ economic growth by providing liquidity that would not be otherwise 
available (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). As they supplement banks’ available funds, remittances 
are a great resource to ease the financial sector’s constraints of countries having inefficient 
credit markets (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009); last but not least, greater availability of 
borrowing funds translates into lower borrowing costs and lower investments volatility 
(Barajas et al., 2008). 
Summing up the effects analyzed up to now, we might conclude that remittances act as an 
insurance instrument allowing to hedge from negative shocks, therefore reducing uncertainty; 
they provide an additional source of income contributing to alleviate households’ poverty and 
contribute to increase the level of investments (both in human capital through education and 
physical capital) by easing credit constraints. However, besides these growth-enhancing 
effects, it is important to point out some pitfalls as well.  The danger of a decreasing labor 
supply adds to the risk of appreciation of the receiving countries’ currencies: high amounts of 
money inflows involve higher inflation rates and a consequent real exchange appreciation. In 
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several countries, especially small ones, the annual total volume of remittances flows is even 
higher than the amount of foreign reserves (World Bank, 2015). The primary result is the 
decline of exports accompanied by a loss of competitiveness; nonetheless, the country would 
pay less for imports and thus may reduce its level of debt by improving the balance of 
payments (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). Anyway, it must be noted that, where remittances are in 
kind rather than cash, the balance of trade improvement might not occur if residents change 
their consumption attitudes: they may start opting for foreign goods (i.e. increase in imports) 
and make the domestic level of production decrease (Mughal, 2013). 
While it is real that higher amounts of remittances flowing to the country imply higher levels 
of sustainable deficit, it is also true that politicians may rely on remittances to support 
economic growth and improve their creditworthiness, therefore postponing essential reforms 
(Catrinescu et al., 2009). Empirical studies confirm that, in remittance receiving countries, 
governments use to deviate from fiscal discipline and increase public expenditure (Barajas et 
al., 2008). In the long term, this inefficient public behavior may cause a lower employment 
level and hence a surge of workers expatriations; remittances amounts would hence be higher 
and might lead residents and government to heavily depend on them. Increasing reliance on 
remittances may make the country experience serious crisis as soon as money transfers 
inflows fall (Mughal, 2013).In addition, a strong reliance on remittances may cause public 
moral hazard to translate into households’ moral hazard: families may use remittances as 
“shock absorbers” and lose any incentive to press for reforms (Hubert Ebeke, 2012). 
Thanks to their counter-cyclical behavior, money transfers have been used by some countries 
(e.g. Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey) as collateral when borrowing in international markets, 
permitting their governments to reduce debt costs and lengthen its maturity. In 2008, banks 
established in developing countries raised more than $20 billion by securitizing remittances 
but, as these nations lack laws on securitization and bankruptcy procedures, it has been 
difficult to develop this business (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009). Anyway, in the last years 
remittances have been taken into account by rating agencies evaluating the countries’ 
creditworthiness. This practice had great impact on countries recording high amounts of 
money transfers inflows (The World Bank, 2015a). 
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A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In the single countries’ balance of payments, remittances may be included in such other items 
as migrants’ transfers or employee compensation; however, it is fundamental to have accurate 
estimates of the remittances volumes to get sufficiently precise predictions of their effects, 
and hence to put in place adequate policies.  
We saw that money transfers may have great positive effects but they have drawbacks as well: 
the prevalence of ones on the others depends on the characteristics of each country. For 
example, some authors (Barajas et al. 2008) argued that the investment level may remain 
stable if capital mobility is high or if remittance receivers have no financial education and do 
not know how to invest that money; they also highlighted that investments are more 
productive if the financial system can take advantage of them because they can contribute to 
lower the costs of financing. As a result, governments should formulate policies encouraging 
remittances’ receivers to devote that money to productive investments (Barajas et al., 2008). 
Catrinescu et al.(2009) pointed out that institutions determine the final output level by 
defining incentives for ﬁnancial and business investments; Barajaset al. (2008) added that 
poor institutions might deviate households from putting pressure on governments for setting 
up new programs (i.e. households’ moral hazard). 
Even if remittances allow reducing the country level of debt, governments should maintain 
some fiscal discipline and avoid using freed-up resources in distortionary ways. Politicians of 
those countries should keep in mind that most inhabitants are remittances-dependent and 
cannot sustain any increase in taxes. Governments should rather opt for growth-enhancing 
choices benefitting the whole society (Barajas et al., 2008). 
In the last years, some immigrants groups have decided to pool remittances and devote them 
to their origin countries’ governments. The most relevant example is that of Hispanic 
communities living in the US who created hometown associations whose objective is to share 
experiences and fund public and private projects in their homelands (Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005). In this way, money do not enrich only some households and families, but the society as 
a whole; furthermore, they promote their culture by sponsoring events in their residence 
towns, they help their members to find an accommodation when arriving in a new country and 
provide them with medical assistance (Milusheva, 2012). 
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IV. REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS (RSPs) 
 
The agents involved in a remittance transfer are the sender, the receiver and the provider of 
service (so-called capturing provider in the sending country and disbursing provider in the 
destination country). Remittance services are primarily offered by informal operators, but they 
are provided by some deposit-taking institutions as well (The World Bank, 2007). When 
deciding to remit, migrants can thus use different channels to transfer money: if they want to 
avoid the use of any intermediary, they may opt for bringing cash home when they visit their 
families; otherwise, they can choose among Money Transfer Operators (MTOs), informal 
intermediaries transferring cash (the most popular are “Hawala”, “Hundi”, “Feich’ien”) or 
traditional banks (Kosse and Vermeulen, 2014).Except for those located in developing 
countries, especially in India, Turkey and the Philippines, banks are not widely used because 
they consider remittances services only as a marginal activity (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). 
 
Remittances transactions usually consist of three main stages: first, the migrant asks an agent 
to transfer money through cash, checks, credit or debit cards; then the funds are settled and, 
finally, the receiver gets the money. Most remittances receivers are unbanked, so migrants use 
to transfer cash; however, some countries like the Philippines, Mexico, Haiti, Nepal, have 
developed remittance systems paying in kind and allowing receivers to buy goods in affiliated 
stores, whose price correspond to the money received. The greatest concern is that sellers may 
take advantage of this habit by raising the price of those goods (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). 
It is usually the sender who pays for the service; the amount charged depends on various 
factors: the level of competition, which in turn depends on entry barriers; the costs incurred 
by the providers, determined by the technology used; the location of both the sender and 
receiver. Since in most countries there are only a few Remittance Service Providers, the trivial 
number of competitors allow them to charge high commissions (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). 
Estimations say that the average cost per transaction is about 15% of the transferred amount 
and it is sometimes even higher if the remittance value is below a specific sum (Daly, 2010). 
Operators’ charges include the cost of sending money, the foreign exchange commission and 
the additional fee. The amount of foreign exchange commission depends on the source and 
destination countries of remittances: some countries have great discrepancies between the 
official and the unofficial exchange rates, while some other have tight exchange controls. The 
amount of the fee is instead always high (i.e. independently of the location and the provider) 
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because RPSs are not endangered by competition: it is not unusual that some RPSs ask to 
larger banks or to the postal network to sign contracts aiming at restricting competition. Many 
developing countries still suffer from many market failures in the financial field; the lack of 
competition is just one of the inefficiencies that policy maker are trying to solve (Maimbo and 
Ratha, 2005). 
Unofficial providers were born because the traditional banking system do not operate in many 
rural areas of some countries, want their customers to be identified, and often requires a 
minimum amount of money to be held at the bank in order to enjoy some services, such as 
money transfer (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005); indeed, unofficial operators are mainly used by 
migrants having no bank accounts (Kosse and Vermeulen, 2014). Moreover, even if 
Remittance Service Providers’ objective is just to offer money transfer services, many states 
want these agencies to conform to standards required to get the banking license.  
Since having a mobile phone is much more easy and common than having a bank account, a 
new trend that is becoming popular is the mobile-based remittance service, which allows 
reducing the costs of transferring money (Watterson, 2012). As previously said, migrants use 
to repeatedly remit small amounts and this practice translates into very high commissions. A 
good solution might be to remit higher amounts and less frequently, but because of the risk of 
theft or loss of money and the liquidity constraints they are subject to, many migrants cannot 
change their habits (Yang, n.a.). Switching to mobile phone remittance may hence be the best 
solution to reduce the commission expenses paid by migrants and escape the danger of losing 
money. In addition, people living in rural and remote areas can also reach these services. 
Likewise, intermediaries may increase the number of customers without needing to be 
physically present. Mobile remittances are now offered by many companies all around the 
world; among them Travelex Money Transfer, Forex International Hong Kong, Dollar 
America Exchange in California, CBN Grupo, New York Bay Remittance, Banco de Oro 
Bank (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). These intermediaries can choose to offer three kinds of 
services: mobile to cash or cash to mobile (depending on the party using cash and the one 
using electronic wallets), and mobile to mobile, which is the cheapest way of transferring 
money (Daly, 2010).The use of this technology is however still low. Plaza, Yousefi and Ratha 
(2016) estimated that in 2013 the value of international mobile-based remittances did not even 
reach the 2% of total remittances. 
Informal RSPs do not usually ask for senders’ identification: it is just because of the 
impossibility to recognize people transferring money that RSPs have been contested for their 
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potential risk of abuse (including money laundering, tax evasion and terrorism financing), 
which adds to the risk of theft. Educated and skilled migrants, who are more conscious of 
these risks, tend to prefer formal intermediaries to transfer their money (Kosse and 
Vermeulen, 2014); however, since remittances volumes are negatively related to transmission 
costs and lower-developed financial systems imply higher costs, migrants tend to opt for 
informal operators (Freund and Spatafora, 2008). 
 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that remittance providers do not correspond to banks and 
the level of competition in their industry is much lower than in the banking system (Ratha and 
Riedberg, 2005). 
Providing access into the banking system for unbanked migrants might bea first step to reduce 
the use of unofficial channels. International banks may sign agreements with informal 
operators to create an integrated financial system, which would benefit both sides: large banks 
would attract new customers, and intermediaries of poorer countries would extend and 
develop their activities. Moreover, since competition in the traditional banking field is much 
higher, fees would be lower and transferring money would be cheaper (Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005). 
South-Asian and African countries have recorded a reduction in remittance costs thanks to the 
collaboration between MTOs, including mobile ones, and banks. In the fourth quarter of 
2014, the worldwide average cost for transferring money decreased from 8.2% to 8%, while 
the weighted average cost (weighted by the extent of bilateral remittance volumes) stayed at 
6%. The fact that the latter cost is lower than the former means that greater corridors are 
cheaper. The World Bank estimated that the cheapest corridors were the UAE and Singapore 
(The World Bank, 2015a). 
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Nevertheless, the enhancement of required standards set to limit money laundering does not 
help reducing costs and act as a barrier to the entry of new agents and cheaper technologies. 
The World Bank suggests reducing such barriers as mobile licensing and exclusiveness for 
incumbents in order to simplify the collaboration among different operators and the 
establishment of new technologies; it in fact reminds that new regulatory frameworks forced 
many banks to exit from remittance activities and caused the subsequent shutdown of those 
MTOs that were not able to operate without the support of banking accounts (World Bank, 
2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Remittance Prices Worldwide, World Bank Retrieved from Dubey, 2015. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the costliest region to 
which to send $200 (average costs)* 
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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PAYMENT SYSTEM AND THE 
UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEM 
 
I. MONEY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES 
 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
Any economic agent frequently engage in money transfer transactions for reasons ranging 
from bill payments to financial or educational support to relatives living elsewhere (i.e. 
remittances). Money transfers services are provided by different kinds of financial 
institutions, such as traditional banks, Money Transfer Operators, Alternative Remittance 
Systems; regardless of the intermediary chosen, they all make use of the payment system.  
The payment system (or more properly, the Payment, Clearing and Settlement System) is an 
essential part of any financial system and includes all the instruments, rules, procedures, 
intermediaries and interbank funds transfer arrangements permitting money to circulate in a 
certain area (European Central Bank, 2010).  After a bank receives a payment instruction by a 
client, the payer and the payee’s banks exchange information about the order through the 
clearing process, consisting in “transmitting, reconciling, and in some cases, confirming 
transfer transactions before their final settlement. During clearing, the sending and receiving 
financial institutions exchange information about the payment, and the amount of funds to be 
settled by those institutions is calculated” (Isern, Donges and Smith, 2006). After having 
checked the availability of funds, settlement finally compensate the two accounts. The correct 
functioning of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement System is ensured by Central Banks, 
which must accurately manage financial, operational and legal risks in order to guarantee 
efficiency. Regulations and institutions have also a role in determining the structure of the 
systems, which hence differ among countries (European Central Bank, 2010). 
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The main purpose of payment systems is to allow agents (private and public individuals, 
firms) to make transactions and to make sure that resources are efficiently allocated. Reliable 
and efficient infrastructures constitute the fundamentals for preserving financial stability; 
moreover, an efficient system guarantees that transaction costs do not go over benefits, and 
hence encourages to trade. Factors like the integration of financial markets and financial 
innovation have posed new challenges because they have contributed to increase the 
worldwide volume of financial transactions; in addition, increasing levels of migration have 
caused a higher demand for cross-border transactions (European Central Bank, 2010). 
 
1. PAYMENT SYSTEM IN THE EU 
 
After the introduction of the unique currency, the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission promoted the creation of the so-called SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) to 
launch a unique, integrated market for non-cash payments (in particular card payments, direct 
debits and credit transfers). The main objective was to increase competition, and hence 
efficiency, by promoting the use of the same payment instruments throughout the Union and 
by ensuring the same rights and obligations to any agents making or receiving payments 
(Virtanen, 2014). The Payment Services Directive defines the payment system as “a funds 
transfer system with formal and standardized arrangements and common rules for the 
processing, clearing and/or settlement of payment transactions” (Directive (EU) 2015/2366). 
Therefore, starting from SEPA introduction in 2008, international payments made within the 
area by any economic agent are treated as domestic ones.  
The European Automated Clearing House Association (EACHA) includes 26 Automated 
Clearing Houses from 22 different countries (European Automated Clearing House 
Association). Automated Clearing Houses usually refer to US electronic networks for 
interbank clearing of fund transfer transactions and providing overnight transaction 
settlement; they are usually operated by the central bank or bank associations and may choose 
to provide services only to deposit-taking institutions or to any kind of financial institution 
(Isern, Donges and Smith, 2006). Within the EU, these entities are called PE-ACHs (Pan 
European ACHs) and consist of Clearing and Settlement Mechanisms (CSMs) arranging both 
clearing and settlement of SEPA-compliant wire transfers and direct debits; clearing and 
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settlement activities may be however carried out separately by different entities (SEPA 
Glossario). 
Within SEPA, many Clearing and Settlement Mechanisms (CSMs) compete for the provision 
of these services; among them: ACH Finland, Banca d’Italia, EBA Clearing, Eurogiro, GSA, 
DIAS, SIBS, STET, TRANSFOND. Clearing and Settlement Mechanisms messaging services 
are instead provided by SIA and SWIFT SCRL by means of international arrangements 
(European Payment Council). SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) is not a payment system but a messaging infrastructure permitting to 
transmit payment instructions for most international interbank transactions. It was created in 
the 70s by some major banks as a worldwide provider of secure financial messaging services 
and interface software for payment systems (European Central Bank, 2010). Each institution 
was given an exclusive identification code (i.e. BIC, Bank Identifier Code) and could transmit 
information through SWIFTNet thanks to a standard code system: SWIFT does not hold 
funds nor offer clearing and settlement services; it simply guarantees a reliable and 
confidential convey of instructions for wire transfers between institutions by providing a 
common language for international payments. The concrete exchange of funds occurs later 
through the payment system or correspondent banking relationships (SWIFT). Therefore, 
EURO1 participants (EURO1 is the unique Real-Time Gross Settlement European system for 
large value and urgent transactions to be made both within the same country and within cross-
border) make use of SWIFTNet to send payment messages, which are usually credit or debit 
transfers; the network then processes those messages and forward them to receiving banks 
(European Payment Council).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barclays Archive Groups. Retrieved from Scott and Zachariadis, 2010.  
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2. PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS 
 
The first payment mechanism to be introduced was barter; it then developed to coins and, 
more recently, to sophisticated tools, such as cards and electronic or mobile instruments. 
“Payment instruments are the mechanisms that people, businesses, and governments use to 
transfer money in the settlement of exchange transactions. These instruments take many forms 
and have many uses”. The most commonly used money transfer instruments are currency, 
checks, money orders, traveler’s checks, debit cards, credit cards, and prepaid cards. These 
devices have been traditionally associated to banks as they are often offered as ancillary 
services to bank accounts; however, we will see that most residents of developing and 
underdeveloped countries are still unbanked and cannot enjoy these facilities. They therefore 
address to informal operators (e.g. hawaladars) which offer easy and fast clearing and 
settlement mechanisms (Isern, Donges and Smith, 2006). 
 
B. FUNDS TRANSFER 
 
When funds transfers require transferring money between accounts held either in the same 
bank or different but connected banks, they are simple book transfers; if the two institutions 
are instead not related by any relationship, transactions involve the use of interbank funds 
transfers systems such as CHIPS and Fedwire which move money from one account to 
another (Madinger, 2011). 
 
1. WHOLESALE FUNDS TRANSFERS 
 
The amazing growth of the banking industry has involved the development of Electronic 
Funds Transfers; most EFTs are handled by the wholesale payment system, which deal with 
large-value transactions between banks acting either on their own or their customers’ behalf. 
In the US, the two main wholesale payment systems for interbank funds transfers are the 
Fedwire Funds Service and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS); they 
arrange the settlement of interbank purchases and sales of federal funds, foreign exchange 
transactions, disbursement or repayment of loans, real estate transactions and other financial 
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market transactions (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, b). Fedwire takes 
care of Real-Time Gross Settlement transfers for US domestic funds, while CHIPS is a 
system for private electronic payments allowing transmitting and settling transactions 
denominated in US dollars among financial institutions; it hence includes some US banks and 
US branches of foreign banks. In order to distinguish the single accounts, each entity is given 
an Universal Identifier Number (Lim, 2008). Settlement may be both bilateral and 
multilateral: banks having positive closing positions get Fedwire payments, so CHIPS is both 
a customer and a competitor of Fedwire; for that reason, most of banks are members of both 
systems (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2002).  
 
2. RETAIL WIRE TRANSFERS 
 
 “A wire transfer is an electronic transfer of funds across a network administered by hundreds 
of banks around the world. Wire transfers allow for individualized transfer of funds from 
single individuals or entities to other individuals or entities, while still maintaining 
efficiencies of fast and secure movement of funds.” (Investopedia). Since money is not 
actually moved, retail wire transfers involve just a virtual movement of funds between 
accounts; they differ from wholesale funds transfers because they usually have to do with low 
value payments originated by retail clients, including debit and credit card transactions at the 
Point Of Sale (POS), Automated Clearing Houses (ACH), Automated Teller Machines 
(ATM) and home banking systems (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, b). 
Money transfer services provided by banks can generally be classified into three types: wire 
transfer via SWIFT; receivers’ accounts credit (even if held in a different bank);accounts 
credit followed by cash withdrawal. The typical wire transfer made through banks starts with 
a payment instruction by a bank, which provides the identification code of the receiving bank; 
messaging systems transmit both payment and settlement instructions and, after some time 
(might be some hours or some days), the recipient’s account is credited (Orozco, 2010). 
International money transfer companies (or nonbank money transmitters) provide comparable 
services but allow transferring money without passing it through bank accounts; they may be 
both large international companies and small local businesses. As most migrants are 
“unbanked”, these entities are commonly chosen by workers expatriates wanting to send 
home part of the money earned abroad: estimations say that about 2 billion of people are 
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unbanked and most of them live in Sub-Saharian countries, Latin America, South Asia and 
US (The Money Cloud Blog, 2015). ACE Money Transfer, RIA Financial Services, 
MoneyGram, Azimo, Dwolla, TransferGo, and TransferWise are the most common 
organizations providing wire transfers services to migrants, but Western Union remains the 
leading company in the field: it enjoys a 15% market share (30 transactions per second on 
average) and it operates in 200 countries (The Money Cloud Blog, 2015; DeParle (2007) 
stated that “migration is so central to Western Union that forecasts of border movements drive 
the company’s stock”. 
 
II. FINANCIAL CHANNELS FOR MONEY TRANSFERS 
 
As I have just reported, effective and efficient payment systems are essential for the correct 
functioning of the economy. These systems have been traditionally associated to the formal 
banking system but, lately, several non-bank entities have emerged and have started providing 
payment services competing with traditional banks’ ones. The phenomenon has been 
particularly evident in developing countries whose majority of residents are unbanked (Awrey 
and van Zwieten, n.a.). I am therefore going to compare the features of the payment services 
provided by the two kinds of “banking” channels and to assess the potential risks associated 
to non-bank activities. 
“A financial channel is any means by which money is transferred” (Isern, Donges and Smith, 
2006). The global financial system has being evolving for many decades; during the last ones, 
the huge increase in competition in the banking sector deriving from the so-called 
deregulation made banks’ profits decrease and they have thus been trying to avoid taxes for 
long time. These factors gave rise to a process known as financial innovation, i.e. the creation 
and the marketing of new kinds of financial products and services in order to reduce the cost 
of credit and to widen the range of financial products and services available (Prates and Farhi, 
2015). The process started in the US in 1930s with the born of investment banks, it went on 
with the introduction of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) in the 1960s, and progressed in 
the last few years with securitization practices, over-the-counter derivatives trade, collateral 
rehypothecation, repo market operations and the coinciding development of the shadow 
banking system (Palan and Nesvetailova, 2014). By renovating the way of conducting credit 
intermediation, financial innovation gave rise to new banking models and practices. Shadow 
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banks do engage in credit intermediation but do not have access to Central Bank liquidity or 
public sector credit guarantees; this means that they do not fall within regulation for usual 
banks (Pozsar, 2008). The shadow banking system has existed for a long time, but starting 
from the 2000s, it has been expanding so much that it overpassed the size of the regular 
banking system (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2015): according to Federal Reserve data, in 
2007 the US shadow banking system accounted for $18 trillion, while traditional banks 
represented just $12 trillion (Pozsar et al., 2010). Non-bank entities has developed all over the 
world but the level of their diffusion varies state by state. They widely spread in emerging 
countries, especially in China, probably because of a lower degree of ruling (Adrian, Ashcraft 
and Cetorelli, 2013). Some nonbank entities succeeded with respect to banks thanks to 
economies of scale and the provision of products and services that usual banks do not offer 
(Pozsar et al., 2010). 
When selecting the Money Transfer Mechanism to use, people take into account such factors 
as the cost, the frequency and the amount of transfers, the level of urgency and the destination 
of those funds (short or long distance; domestic or international; the financial channels 
available at the end point).The three categories of financial intermediaries whom customers 
may address their money transfer needs are formal, semiformal and informal: 
 Formal channels include entities such as commercial, agricultural, developmental and 
saving banks but also credit unions. The key difference with the other two categories 
is that they are subject to strict regulations and supervision of competent authorities 
and that they provide backstop against credit risk. Banks are able to provide 
remittance services through the SWIFT system or may act as agent for Money 
Transfer Operators; however, they do not operate in rural and remote areas, so either 
the sender or the receiver of the money transferred may not have access to them (Isern, 
Donges and Smith, 2006). 
 
 Semiformal channels are authorized, non-deposit-taking institutions, also known as 
shadow banks. With the term shadow banks we include hedge funds (e.g. Black 
Rock), money market funds, mutual funds (e.g. Fidelity Investments), Structured 
Investment Vehicles (SIV), credit investment funds, exchange traded funds, credit 
hedge funds, private equity funds, securities broker dealers, credit insurance providers, 
securitization and finance companies (e.g. Household Finance Corporation), but also 
intermediaries such as Money Transfer Operators, mobile payment systems, 
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pawnshops, peer-to-peer lending websites and bond-trading platforms set up by 
technology firms (Labes, 2013; A.A.K., 2016). 
Since non-bank entities are not allowed to take deposits from the public, a few years 
ago they started using deposits surrogates as a form of funding, including commercial 
papers, repo, brokerage accounts and MMMF shares. It is important to note that these 
substitutes offer higher return rates with respect to common deposits, but they are not 
protected by any insurance (Jackson, 2013). 
The Financial Stability Board defined the phenomenon as “the system of credit 
intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking 
system‟; “this implies focusing on credit intermediation that takes place in an 
environment where prudential regulatory standards and supervisory oversight are 
either not applied or are applied to a materially lesser or different degree than is the 
case for regular banks engaged in similar activities.” (FSB, 2011). Hence, their 
services are similar to those of traditional banks (bank-like activities), but they are not 
subject to financial regulations. As a consequence, they do not need any banking 
license to operate and can touch higher leverage ratios than traditional banks, thus 
exposing themselves to higher risk; indeed, they had a great role in causing the 
financial crisis since they engaged in risky activities like securitized lending and 
derivative operations (Plantin, 2014). 
Shadow banks are not totally disconnected from traditional ones: the former may be 
backed by bank holding companies or by major nonbank financial institutions 
(nonbank-affiliated broker-dealers or insurance companies); some other are 
independent of any institution or they are sponsored by government (Adrian and 
Ashcraft, 2012). Consequently, various shadow banking activities (e.g. repos) were 
carried out within banks; securitization practices were carried out either by investment 
banks (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch) or 
commercial ones (Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America) because both categories 
were looking for new sources of revenue (Gorton and Metrick, 2009). Similarly, 
Structured Investment Vehicles were sponsored by commercial or investment banks or 
even a combination of them; the latter case makes clear the reason why insolvency 
spread to different financial institutions (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2015). The 
existence of shadow banks has been caused by such events as regulatory arbitrage and 
financial innovation. The last factor primarily derives from the very low interest rates 
paid on accounts held at banks and from the absence of a deposit insurance for 
Non-bank Financial Intermediaries 
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depositors (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012); regulatory arbitrage instead refers to activity 
changes permitting to increase net cash flows by decreasing the costs of regulation 
(Adrian, Ashcraft and Cetorelli, 2013). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
stated that, in the years preceding the global financial crisis, “regulation and 
supervision of traditional banking had been weakened significantly, allowing 
commercial banks and thrifts to operate with fewer constraints and to engage in a 
wider range of financial activities, including activities in the shadow banking system.” 
The Commission also concluded that “[t]his deregulation made the financial system 
especially vulnerable to the financial crisis and exacerbated its effects” (Angelides, 
2011). 
 
 Informal channels: these intermediaries have widely expanded in places where 
traditional banks do not operate and offer cheap and fast services. Since they do not 
provide any guarantee against the risk of theft or loss, these networks are based on 
trust.  
 
A. FORMAL AND SEMIFORMAL CHANNELS 
 
Credit unions. Credit unions are regulated financial institutions offering traditional banking 
services such as deposit accounts, loans and savings, which were born to provide access to 
financial services to unbanked individuals. Most migrants however still lack access to banks, 
so, since 2000, credit unions have offered remittance services through the International 
Remittances Network (IRnet), i.e. an electronic platform  launched by the World Council of 
Credit Unions (WOCCU), covering both developed countries (United States, Europe, 
Australia) and emerging ones (Latin America, Asia, Africa). In order to provide financial 
access to as many people as possible, the network allows transferring money also from/to 
non-credit unions and charge very low commission rates. Transfers are accomplished by three 
international Money Transfer Companies: MoneyGram, Travelex and Vigo Remittance 
Corporation (World Council of Credit Unions). Other categories of banks (e.g. commercial 
ones) provide remittance services as well but they require the receiver to hold a bank account 
and charge higher fees. 
Money Transfer Companies. Money transfers represent a global growing business since it 
serves governments, firms and private individuals; besides credit unions, many pure Money 
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Transfer Operators have therefore tried to enter this potentially profitable market. Money 
Transfer Operators provide remittance services as primary business and may offer foreign 
currency exchange services in addition; the category hence includes exchange houses, money 
service businesses, payment institutions and mobile network operators (Todoriki et al., 2014). 
The biggest players are: AIB, Azimo, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Halifax, HiFX, HSBC, 
Lloyds Bank, MoneyCorp, Nationwide, Natwest, PayPal, Permanent TSB, RBS (Royal Bank 
of Scotland), Skrill, The Co-operative Bank, Transferwise, Travelex, Western Union, UK 
Forex (part of the Oz Forex group), Ulster Bank, XE.com, Neteller, WorldFirst, WorldRemit, 
TransferGo (CurrencyFair, 2016); there exists also operators serving specific region or 
countries, e.g. RiaEnvia, Dolex, Siguue, Vigo, Delgado, Intermex, Nexar, GroupEx, Money 
Express, Telepay. They usually do not require opening accounts but they do ask for 
customers’ identification; as for costs, fees have been shrinking as a result of the increasing 
competition, but MTCs are still more expensive than informal operators (Isern, Donges and 
Smith, 2006). 
Postal systems. Post offices have traditionally offered money transfer services since they 
operate also in the countryside but, although they signed agreements with some of the above-
listed MTCs, postal networks are generally used for domestic transfers rather than 
international ones.  These entities thus entered in Eurogiro, which “is a unique payments 
network that connects different payments "ecosystems", e.g. postal organizations, post banks, 
commercial banks and other payment service providers, focusing on cross border high volume 
- low value payments” (Eurogiro). Eurogiro Network and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) 
have signed an agreement to connect their electronic networks and have created a new 
product called Tele Money Order (Isern, Donges and Smith, 2006). 
Digital Banks. Some institutions have launched mobile financial services in order to provide 
access to banking services to unbanked individuals at lower cost; however, although a large 
share of its population uses mobile phones, interviews in sub-Saharan Africa highlighted that 
less than 20% of people did actually converted to mobile payments (Kendall, Schiff and 
Smadja, 2014). In India, the DBS have just launched a digital bank allowing holding deposits, 
withdrawing and transferring money very easily through an e-wallet, without signing any 
document. Monese is another operator offering similar digital banking services, targeted to 
worker expatriates living in the UK and not having the citizenship there (Smart Money, 
2016). 
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B. INFORMAL CHANNELS: UNDERGROUND BANKING 
 
Informal Funds Transfer (IFTs) refers to “a currency or value transfer system that operates 
informally to transfer money as a business” (Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, a), or more specifically “financial service that accepts cash, cheques, other monetary 
instruments or other stores of value in one location and pays a corresponding sum in cash or 
other form to a beneficiary in another location by means of a communication, message, 
transfer or through a clearing network to which the money/value transfer system belongs”; it 
hence covers “the full range of financial services involved in transferring money, including 
everything from banks to systems operating in full or in part outside conventional banking 
channels” (FATF, 2005). As they are mainly used by migrants who send part of their income 
earned abroad to their families, the Financial Action Task Force refers to these informal banks 
as Alternative Remittance Systems. They are cheap, fast and do not depend from the 
traditional banking system; they are not subject to specific rules but some countries require 
them to get the operating license and to register (Chene, 2008). They therefore provide 
financial services “outside the conventional, regulated financial institutional systems” (Passas, 
1999). Where financial sector is not well developed and formal financial intermediaries do not 
operate in some areas, IFTS may represent the unique way for conducting financial 
transactions (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, a.). In the previous chapter, 
I have highlighted the great role that remittances have in sustaining the economic growth of 
recipient countries but I have also emphasized that Informal Transfer Systems have been 
blamed of contributing to money laundering because they allow people to transfer money 
anonymously.  
Informal Funds Transfer Systems derives their name from the fact that they were born just as 
an informal and cheap method for transferring money and values targeted to people belonging 
to the same ethnic group and lacking access or confidence in the traditional banking system 
(Blum et al., 1999). They are also called underground banks, but, even if they operate in 
parallel to the traditional banking system, this appellative is not very appropriate: first, these 
offices do not operate secretly (not underground), rather they liberally work close to other 
stores and they are often advertised on newspapers; second, they do not carry out typical 
banking activities related to credit intermediation (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). Their 
services do resemble some of those offered by traditional banks and by non-bank institutions 
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such as Western Union and MoneyGram, but underground bankers do not record transactions 
and remitters’ identities (van de Bunt, H. 2008)  
Informal banks may be divided into two main categories: Informal Funds Transfer Systems 
(IFTS) and Informal Value Transfer Methods (IVTM). IFTSs are much older because they 
include fund and value transfers activities first born in China and in the Indian region to 
satisfy immigrants’ needs; they were hence originally used only for legitimate purposes and 
then evolved into forms of unofficial banking. Some key examples are Hawala, Fei ch’ien, 
padala, black market for peso. IVTMs instead refer to systems born with Internet and 
technological changes, which engage in informal high-value money transfers usually hiding 
illegal operations; they make use of the traditional banking system but do not record any 
transaction. Among IVTMs, there are: in-kind payments/transfers, invoice manipulation, trade 
diversion, e-payments, credit/debit cards used by multiple individuals, use of correspondent 
accounts and so on (Passas, 2003). The separation of the two groups is primarily used to make 
a distinction between licit and illicit transactions; I will anyway generally refer to them as a 
unique category. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shah, 2007.  
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1. MAIN IFVS AROUND THE WORLD 
 
Informal Funds Transfers predate Western banks and operate in several countries; the biggest 
systems are Hawala and Fei ch’ien. Hawala is the most famous network, born in the Indian 
subcontinent, where it takes the name of Hundi. The name Hawala was given by the Arabics 
and derives from hawalah, i.e. a “transfer of money or information between two people using 
a third person” (Shehu, 2004); Hundi adds the connotations of 'trust' and 'reference' (Jost and 
Sandhu, 2003). The system was initially created to settle accounts within Indian rural 
communities; it recently extended to other areas because workers expatriate from India 
moving to Africa and South-East Asia needed to have a safe and efficient mean for settling 
accounts (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). It operates autonomously, meaning that it does 
not depend on the formal financial system and makes use of codes and messages transferred 
by mail, telephone or fax (Shehu, 2004). Even if it has developed in Europe and America as 
well, Middle East, Africa and Asia are still the areas where Hawala is most used; nonetheless, 
statistics say that most Hawala transactions are carried out in the United Arab Emirates, where 
there are more than a hundred exchange houses (Wilson, 2002); Dubai is in fact considered as 
the central clearing house for Hawala transactions (Thompson, 2006). 
 
The Chinese Fei ch’ien (that means “flying money or coin”, also known as Chiao Hui and 
Nging Sing Kek) is much older than Hawala since it dates back to the 6
th 
century After Christ. 
Although it works similarly to Hawala, the fact that the latter is founded on trust and 
connections allows its broker to use less negotiable tools and is often used for money 
laundering objectives; on the contrary, Chinese systems often require to remit the money 
before the conclusion of transactions but they are less subject to abuse (Buencamino and 
Gorbunov, 2002). Depending on their security assessment, the two systems just described 
operate in different places, which may be both in private buildings and in grocery, jewels or 
textile shops (Shehu, 2004).  
There exists many other Alternative Remittance Systems whose activities are similar to 
Hawala and Chop ones: among them, the Phoe Kuan in Thailandia, Padala in the Philippines, 
Hui Kuan in Hong Kong. Whatever their name, all these networks present some common 
features: they are normally located in countries having high shares of expatriate workers in 
order to provide them with remittance services and enjoy vast networks covering many 
countries;  their core business is money transfer but they also engage in currency exchange 
and other activities. 
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The Black Market Peso Exchange System is instead a bit different. It was set up in the 70s by 
Colombian traders in order to get hard currencies without restrictions. At that time, the 
government used to do severe exchange controls by setting limits on the amount of foreign 
currency that could be purchased and importers did not often have enough money to settle 
their accounts (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). Its objective is hence to simplify the 
exchange of currencies by selling dollars to Colombian entrepreneurs wanting to buy 
American goods for export. Later, the system however started being used to launder money 
coming from drug traffic: the peso brokers deposit dollars deriving from narcotics trafficking 
in the US accounts and then sell them to Colombian businessmen needing that currency to 
buy goods for export (Sloan, 1999). Similar black markets operate also in other countries; the 
one in Hong Kong is the most famous and it is mostly used to transfer money from Hong 
Kong to China, which exercises currency controls (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002).  
Unofficial systems like Hawala operate similarly to other remittance providers but most of 
times they are not licensed and registered (Wilson, 2002). Since they are part of the informal 
channel, Alternative Remittance Systems are subject to specific regulations varying state by 
state. Hawala systems are even illegal in such countries as Pakistan and India where 
speculation practice in foreign exchange transactions (i.e. using rates other than the official 
ones when converting local to foreign currency and vice versa) are forbidden, and this is one 
of the reason why Hawala is banned (Chene, 2008). Since many workers coming from India 
and Pakistan migrate in the United Arab Emirates, and most of gold sent to these two 
countries comes from Dubai, a direct consequence of India and Pakistan strict regulations is 
the use of the UAE to make transactions through Hawala systems. To evade these two 
countries’ rules it is hence sufficient to make money pass through brokers set up in Dubai, 
which enjoys a strategic position among the Gulf, South Asia and Africa (Jost and Sandhu, 
2003). Jamwal (2002) reports the result of a U.S. Treasury Department study that denoted 
Pakistan, India, and Dubai as the Hawala Triangle to move money clandestinely. Pakistani 
financial authorities stated that almost $3 million are carried every day from Karachi to 
Dubai, mainly to buy gold (Farah, 2002). 
The growth of ethnic banks have shown to be negatively correlated to the expansion of formal 
financial sector, which means that countries having inefficient banking systems are exactly 
those where Informal Funds Transfers have most developed. Policymakers should carefully 
monitor the spreading out of these intermediaries because they may have striking monetary 
and fiscal effects: transferring money through underground banks definitely influence the 
composition of broad money (informal transactions increase cash circulation),but also money 
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demand for both domestic and foreign currency because they take foreign currency away from 
the formal sector and makes the spread wider. The usage of unofficial systems may also 
implicate a loss of revenue for governments (informal entities are not taxed on profits because 
money does not flow into the official system) and for traditional banks which may lose part of 
their business. Moreover, even if Hawala transactions involve changes in foreign asset and 
external debt positions, and should be hence included in the Balance of Payments, they are not 
recorded in official accounts since they flow through unofficial payment systems (El-Qorchi, 
Maimbo and Wilson, 2003). 
As parallel banking face new demand patterns and progressing Anti-Money Laundering 
regulations, operators are constantly evolving their services. Some credit card companies sell 
debit cards in exchange for cash, which can be withdrawn through any ATM by third people 
knowing the PIN; in this case, the card buyer is the only person subject to AML checks. 
Likewise, mobile phone companies allow remitting money by storing value in SIM cards and 
using it in countries with emerging mobile arrangements. Some African bus companies offer 
remittance services even by using cash from tickets. Internet-based remittance agencies are 
developing as well; the major one is set up in the US but works in Hong Kong. It makes use 
of the Global Integrated Funds Transfer System (GIFTS) to provide transfer of funds through 
ATM cards backed by accounts (FATF, 2005). 
 
2. TRANSACTIONS FUNCTIONING 
 
Alternative Remittance Systems are alleged to handle between 100 and 300 billion dollars per 
year (Chene, 2008) through virtual transfers of money, i.e. “money transfer without money 
movement” (Jost and Sandhu, 2003); most of times, transactions involve only an exchange of 
debt, so money does not pass through any Central Bank nor SWIFT (Fisher and Hills, 2002).  
Underground bankers usually operate through legitimate businesses, gold or silver shops, 
remittance houses, moneychangers or unregulated financial houses (Trehan, 2003). Typical 
transactions in Hawala-like systems involve four agents (the sender, the receiver and two 
brokers) and they are carried out according to the following steps: the client first asks the 
broker to send money to a specific person (i.e. the beneficiary) living in another town or 
abroad; the broker sends the request to his partner (by mail or telephone) in that town/country, 
giving details allowing to identify the beneficiary, and he gives an identification code to the 
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sender, which must be exhibited by the receiver in order to get the money. The Hawaladar 
profits by charging an exchange rate spread or a fee: the former is usually computed on the 
basis of unofficial exchange rate because no foreign exchange transactions take actually 
place; the latter instead depends on such factors as the location of receiver’s town (if he/she 
lives in remote areas and/or in countries lacking infrastructures, the commission is higher), the 
amount of money to remit (higher amounts may enjoy some discount), the frequency of 
transfers made by the same client, the ties between the Hawala dealer and the customer, the 
timing of transfer (if the transaction is urgent, Hawaladars charge higher fees) and the 
payment currency (local or foreign) (Passas, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two partner brokers do not record the transaction by contracts or paper trails since the 
system is based on trust between parties. As stated by Chene (2008), “the system is culture 
friendly”, so migrants having strong ties with Hawala brokers can make transactions very 
easily. This practice makes it very difficult for authorities to recover the details of the 
transactions, including the identification of both senders and receivers. Connections are hence 
the basis on which Hawala networks are built up: the fact that in India the system is called 
Hundi, i.e. trust, confirms the importance of personal connection between users and brokers 
(Jost and Sandhu, 2003). 
Gold is frequently used to balance the books of Hawaladars operating in different places, but 
settlement may even involve formal banking channels. As settlement operations are carried 
out periodically, Hawaladars must take into account foreign exchange rate fluctuations before 
settling. Depending on whether the provider carries out other businesses or not, settlement 
may be accomplished in several ways (FATF, 2005); some procedures examples are:  
Source: Shah, 2007. 
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 Import transactions: HA (i.e. Hawaladar in country A, who is the debtor) may finance 
exports to HB (creditor) which acts as importer and accepts goods rather than cash;  
 Simple reverse Hawala transaction: a payment in the opposite direction, i.e. if 
someone remitted from country A to B, HB gives local currency to the beneficiary but 
do not receive money from HA; later, when someone in country B asks to transfer 
money to country A, HA pays without getting the sum from HB. Net settlement 
through banking wire transfers occurs only if flows between A and B are very 
disproportionate. 
 Complex reverse Hawala transaction: broker in country B (HB) gets money from a 
person wanting to have funds abroad but living in country C, which is subject to 
capital controls (e.g. countries in the Indian region and Africa). Settlement may be 
carried out in different ways: HB asks help to HA, which may suggest recurring to HC 
either because they are correspondent or because they still have to settle their 
accounts;  alternatively, HA may order HC to make funds available for any receiver in 
country C; finally HB and HC may involve in a direct transaction and ask HA to settle 
their positions; 
 Bilateral settlement: HA simply makes a payment into HB’s accounts; 
 Multilateral settlement: same as bilateral settlement, but HA deposit money in HB’s 
foreign account, i.e. accounts held in countries with convertible currencies; 
 International services: HA settle his debt by providing services like education, medical 
assistance or travel to HB or residents of country B; 
 International investment transaction: HA buys financial products or services for HB 
(bonds, stocks but even real estate), whose country restrict foreign investments. 
 Transfers through Conventional Banking Systems. 
 Physical Cash Movement.  
Except for the last two cases, cash does not materially move cross-borders; settlement simply 
consists in adjusting credit and debt positions among Hawala dealers (El-Qorchi, Maimbo and 
Wilson, 2003; FATF, 2005 and 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hawala dealers often have accounts in different places to make settlement process easier and 
to reduce their exposure to currency rate fluctuations. Anyway, if they do not have foreign 
accounts, a common practice is to settle positions by recurring to third-party intermediaries, 
usually located in other countries; by doing so, they can enjoy quicker settlement and lower 
costs in terms of fees and exchange rates. Most of these intermediaries are established in 
places offering economies of scale and more convenient foreign exchange rates, for example 
Dubai, New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland (Passas, 2003).  
 
 
 
Balance Sheet Effects of Prototype Hawala Transaction(Dollar 
($) and local currency (LC) components, as indicated) 
Source: Wilson, 2002. 
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Users’ Profile. Alternative Remittance Systems are generally used by migrants leaving poor 
families and moving abroad in order to get a job. Most of times both senders and receivers 
lack financial access because credit institutions do not operate in their areas or just because 
they are poor and they cannot afford those service; this is why underground banks are also 
called “the poor man’s banking system” (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). Additionally, in 
case of wars and conflicts, IFTS are considered a safer means of transferring money; 
Afghanistan is an emblematic case because during the conflict and the Taliban regime, 
Hawala has completely substituted the formal sector. The most common origin countries of 
Hawala’s users are those having many worker expatriates, such as the Indian region, Middle 
East and East Asia. Some Non-Governmental Organizations have also started using 
underground banks in order to supply monetary aids to some populations (Chene, 2008). 
 
Mechanics of IVTS and Settlement Process in 
IVTS in view of Possibly Multiple Intermediaries C 
Source: Passas, 2003. 
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3. WHY IVTS HAVE NOT BEEN SUBSTITUTED BY 
BANKS 
 
Informal systems have developed because of the increasing migration flows to developed 
countries recorded in the 70s and the resulting increasing need of sending money home. Even 
though traditional banks have been intercontinentally expanding, these financial 
intermediaries did not arrange for efficient targeted services so most workers expatriates and 
families remained unbanked, meaning that they could not use the formal sector for their 
transactions (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). Moreover, banking channels between some 
countries have not existed for long time; for example, between Kuwait and Pakistan or among 
Australia and some African states (Passas, 1999). Shortages in economic growth and 
institution development hence force people to use informal channels. Finally, underground 
banks may be the only available means of transferring funds in countries going through wars 
and conflicts such as Somalia and Afghanistan (FATF, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The political and economic instability characterizing developing countries implies strict 
currency controls, inadequate payment systems, high levels of bureaucratic compliance and 
overvalued currencies, which act as taxes on remittances. High instability therefore translates 
into stricter regulations on trade, currency exchange and movement of money; all these facts 
in turn imply a growing need of circumventing rules by using alternative, less regulated 
Account penetration around the world 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012. 
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channels. Empirical studies found out that an increase by 10% in the black market premium 
causes a reduction of 3% in remittances made by recurring to official channels; hence, 
countries protecting their currencies may force residents to use informal ways to match supply 
and demand for foreign currency. Other facts causing the persistence of the informal banking 
system are the lack of financial access of poorer segments of population, the absence of bank 
branches in some remote rural areas, the lack of confidence in regular banks, and the high 
costs charged by traditional banks and major formal Money Transfer Operators (e.g. Western 
Union). Last but not least, the confidentiality ensured by underground banks have attracted 
people wanting to evade regulations and/or involving in criminal activities (Buencamino and 
Gorbunov, 2002). 
 
C. DIFFERENCES WITH TRADITIONAL 
BANKS/BENEFITS FOR USERS 
 
Likewise traditional banks, Informal Funds Transfer Systems offer payment systems as well, 
but they make use of informal channels rather than formal ones. Some main features of 
underground banks differentiate them by traditional ones: 
 Trust-based: ties and kinships are at the base of these systems; parties believe in each 
other. Hawaladars have rarely cheated their clients and this has implied fewer litigation 
cases. When defraud events take place, hawaldars are severely punished;  
 No use of negotiable instruments: senders are not asked to use cheques or other kinds 
of instruments; they can simply transfer money by asking brokers to communicate the 
amount to his partner operating abroad or in another city. Moreover they require a very 
low level of technology; 
 Cheaper services: fees are lower (usually ranging between 25 and 50% of those 
charged by banks) and offer more favorable currency exchange rates;  
 Efficiency: transactions are concluded within a few hours or a couple of day at 
maximum thanks to the extension of their networks; wire transfers at banks take 
instead about a week because they work only on business days and do not operate in 
remote areas; 
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 Reliability: while transactions carried out by regular banks involve many agents 
(different branches of different banks), IVTS only involve two partner brokers and 
transactions are direct; 
 No bureaucratic requirements: Alternative Remittance Systems do not ask for 
Identification Documents. This fact makes these operators attractive both for criminals 
and for illegal immigrants who cannot access traditional banking services; 
 Anonymity: after the transactions take place, agents do not issue any paper trail so 
transactions are not recorded. Trust between participants hence guarantees secrecy and 
allows circumventing currency controls and tax payments; 
 No language obstacle: Hawaladars usually speak immigrants’ native language, while 
bankers do not. 
(Jost and Sandhu, 2003). 
All these aspects make Informal Funds Transfer Systems much more advantageous than 
banks, Money Transfer Operators and other kinds of agents offering remittance services. In 
addition, Hawala transactions may be valuable if remittances are sent from countries with 
convertible currencies to countries with inconvertible ones (Wilson, 2002). Buencamino and 
Gorbunov (2002) reported the point of view of some researchers who argued that “a business 
culture based on trust may prevent widespread use of formal financial systems. In the 
“modern” financial world, there is so much distrust that every letter has to be documented.”  
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CHAPTER 3: MONEY LAUNDERING 
ACTIVITES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE 
REAL ECONOMY 
 
I. MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERNS  
 
Financial and technological integration have made trading transactions cheaper and faster, 
leading to a surge in cross border transactions, which have become easier and easier; in 
addition, the globalization process and the introduction of a single currency in the EU have 
facilitated the integration of various financial markets. Money launderers have obviously 
benefitted from these improvements since dirty money can be easily diverted among different 
jurisdictions and illicit transactions are much less detectable (Buchanan, 2004). Both formal 
and informal financial institutions may well be involved in different kinds of crimes, such as 
credit card frauds or selling of fraudulent financial products. Money laundering is another 
very common form of crime (Ardizzi et al., 2014). 
Even though in many states underground banks are considered as a legitimate substitute of 
traditional banks, criminals may use them for money laundering or terrorism financing 
purposes because these intermediaries are subject to a lower degree of regulation and do not 
record transactions (Rees, 2010). For this reason, Hawala transactions are denoted by two 
different terms depending on whether they are legal or not: in the former case we speak about 
white Hawala, while in the second case it is black Hawala. White Hawala transactions are 
standard remittances sent by migrants in order to help their families; black Hawala instead 
refers to such illicit operations as narcotics traffic, tax evasion, terrorism financing and so on 
(Jost and Sandhu, 2003). The UAE is one of the three countries that maintained relationships 
with the Talibans and authorities said that the majority of money used for the terrorist attack 
on 11
th
 September 2001 did flow through Hawaladars operating in Dubai, which enjoys an 
almost unregulated gold market and open banking centers (Shehu, 2004). 
The formal channels of the financial industry have been increasingly regulated and supervised 
by authorities, especially after the beginning of the financial crisis. Lawbreakers are therefore 
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forced to make use of networks where regulation is less strict, such as non-bank ﬁnancial 
institutions (bureau de change, check cashing services, insurers, brokers and traders) 
(Buchanan, 2004). Many researchers agree that political instability may also act as an obstacle 
for people trying to escape controls (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). 
 
A. MONEY LAUNDERING DEFINITION 
  
The U.S. Department of Justice has defined money laundering as “the process by which 
criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into 
goods and services. It allows criminals to infuse their illegal money into the stream of 
commerce, thus corrupting ﬁnancial institutions and the money supply, thereby giving 
criminals unwarranted economic power” (FBI, 2011). 
Earnings from criminal businesses are usually in cash because this payment instrument 
ensures anonymity. Operations meant to launder money involve three different stages: 
 Placement: launderers try to find a legitimate source for money having illicit origin; 
most of times money is passed through traditional banking accounts; if the amount to 
deposit is very large, they may opt for using different accounts held in different banks.  
 Layering: black money is hidden through multiple transfers so it is hard to detect all 
the transactions; cash may be converted into monetary instruments or real assets, 
which are later sold. Since most of times dirty money is transferred to companies 
established in tax haven countries or to offshore accounts, this phase usually 
encompasses at least two jurisdictions. 
 Integration: money is reintroduced in the formal economy through financial or real 
estate investments and goes back to launderers as legitimate (clean) money. 
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Alternative Remittance Systems are suitable to launder money as they can make illicit money 
appear as licit and permit depositing it without having to comply with any legal requirement; 
money laundering practices made through these channels are hence very easy. Placement of 
money is particularly easy to accomplish since brokers can vindicate the deposited money as 
profits coming from the carrying out of their business. Layering of criminal proceeds does not 
present any obstacle because, as we saw before, Informal Transfers Systems do not record 
transactions and it is therefore difficult to recover and detect them; moreover, IVTs have 
partners in many countries and money can be distributed among them (Chene, 2008).  
 
 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
Source: The World Bank, 2004. 
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B. FORMS OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
Many different procedures are used to clean dirty money; depending on the kind chosen, it 
gets easier to understand whether the operation is a sporadic event or a regular practice (Blum 
et al., 1999).   
These practices may involve both the financial and the real sector. As for the former, 
launderers can invest money in low-risk shares and bonds to get rid of cash; in alternative, 
they may opt for derivatives that are definitely riskier but still liquid. If they do not invest in 
financial securities, they can divide cash into many banking accounts below the reporting 
threshold in order to circumvent disclosure requirements (i.e. smurfing). Most of times they 
choose offshore shell banks, i.e. companies “that do not conduct any commercial or 
manufacturing business or any other form of commercial operation in the country where their 
registered ofﬁce is located” (FATF): they do not pay any tax on profits, they can act 
anonymously (they generally provide services only to non-residents) and are not obliged to be 
physically present in the jurisdiction where they operate. Just because they are established in 
the so-called Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs), they guarantee banking 
secrecy and conceals the identity of the funds’ beneficial owner. The greatest offshore 
financial centers are the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Panama and The Netherlands Antilles. 
Multiple indirect relationships among banks make money laundering even easier: as described 
in the previous chapter, wire transfers involving interbank transactions are arranged by 
Fedwire, CHIPS and SWIFT; when different banks are not connected, these transfers require 
passing through many intermediaries which may not even know each other and simply 
assume that previous intermediaries have accomplished with customers documentation and 
identification requirements. Launderers may also buy travelers’ cheques to easily transfer 
money abroad or even an insurance policy on one or more assets: to get cash back, they will 
make periodic claims on the asset(s) covered. Finally, if they instead want to avoid depositing 
or moving large amounts of cash, launderers can make use of black markets for foreign 
currency, e-Cash or online banking (Utrecht, 2006). 
Dirty money can be laundered through the real sector as well. Casinos cheques are probably 
the easiest way to turn illegal money into legal; however, launderers may opt for investing in 
consumer or luxury goods and real estate assets, which they will resell to get cash back; 
investing in gold is also very attractive since it is easily convertible into cash, ensures 
anonymity and it is exempt from international reporting requirements (Utrecht, 2006). A 
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senior US law enforcement official said that “gold is a huge factor in the moving of terrorist 
money because you can melt it, smelt it or deposit it on account with no questions asked” 
(Farah, 2002). Moreover, gold and other precious stones may be illegally traded through 
smuggling activities, which involve also drugs, human trafficking, women for prostitution, 
arms, stolen vehicles, cigarettes, medicines; these practices are commonly used to bypass 
restrictions, sanctions, embargo, taxes and duties (Passas, 2003). Smuggling activities 
involving gold are very common in India and Pakistan because demand for this metal is very 
high in these two countries; money and gold pass through money laundering centers such as 
Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong (Farah, 2002; Trehan, 2003).Similarly to the above-
mentioned shell companies, launderers may make use of front companies to layer dirty 
money; import-export businesses are also widely used for hiding illegal money through 
double invoicing (moving funds into or out of a country), misinvoicing (i.e. over-reporting of 
income through fake purchases and sales) and under- or over-valuation of goods (e.g. 
reporting higher import prices) (Utrecht, 2006).  
 
1. HAWALA CASES OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
Generally, suspects of money laundering activities arise in the following cases: low-income 
people present accounts with high turnover; money is wired out bank accounts, sent to 
companies carrying out their business in different sectors or to agents involved in illicit 
activities; local market suffers from foreign exchange fluctuations whose cause is not evident; 
agencies filled in some Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs); high volume of money is daily 
moved and/or there are no records of large transactions; some customers’ transactions differ 
from usual ones (Passas, 2003). 
Hawala systems have been often used for money laundering purposes. Most of times they 
helped people to traffic narcotics, but they have been also used for terrorism financing, tax 
and currency controls evasion, violation of intellectual properties, gambling and alien 
smuggling. As for narcotics trafficking, authorities detected some cases of laundering of 
money coming from the sale of heroin, opium and hashish: money was deposited either in 
formal institutions (banks, foreign exchange offices) or in the Hawala system. There was a 
case in which money deriving from narcotics, after having been deposited in Hawala 
accounts, was used to buy weapons for terrorists; again, Hawala has been used to transfer 
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money from North America to South Asia to pay alien smuggling commissions (Jost and 
Sandhu, 2003). In the 90s, Hawala was involved in a big political scandal known as “the 
Hawala scandal” or “Jain diaries”, where Indian politicians got money from four Hawala 
brokers (the Jain brothers) who kept records of transactions in their diaries. From February 
1988 to April 1991, those officials received US $ 18 million bribery flowing from London 
and Dubai dealers to Indian ones. The money was sometimes passed through foreign banks’ 
accounts (Indian Mirror, 1999). 
 
C. EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY 
 
Money laundering activities implicate negative effects on the economy. Besides allowing 
avoiding taxes, thereby contracting government revenues, they make financial markets 
unstable and therefore reduce growth. As I reported above, launderers often use front 
companies which they fund through illicit money rather than by bank loans; the former form 
of funding is obviously much cheaper and may make competition very hard for existing 
companies (Schott, 2006). Resources may be misallocated and investments distorted because 
launderers do not look for investments maximizing returns but for those allowing to easily 
evade detection (e.g. real estate properties and luxury goods); as a consequence, other more 
productive sectors may suffer, especially if goods are imported (Utrecht, 2006). Moreover, as 
they are concerned only about a few kinds of assets, their high willingness to pay may lead to 
higher prices, which turn out to be excessive for other buyers; Keh (1996) reports an example 
about a Colombian group who bought a very large area of land, pushing prices four times 
higher.  
Countries guaranteeing banking secrecy or not engaging much in money laundering detection 
are obviously more appealing for criminals, especially if their GDP is high and they enjoy a 
wide range of trading partners. On the other hand, if residents feel threatened by corruption in 
the financial sector, they lose trust in the system and opt for other means for conducting 
transactions, which results in a loss of customers and profits for formal institutions (Schott, 
2006).However, high levels of corruption translates into higher risk of losing money, which 
discourage launderers to act in some countries (Utrecht, 2006). It is also worth noticing that 
laundered funds deposited at banks are often unexpectedly withdrawn and transferred, thus 
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making banks vulnerable to liquidity issues; these problems may be exacerbated if 
investigations impose costs and penalties on the institution (Schott, 2006).  
 
II. MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION 
 
In the previous chapter I reported the most relevant factors driving people to use Informal 
Value Transfer Systems rather than formal banking channels when transferring money; 
however, we saw that, in countries with exchange currency controls, IFTS are illegal because 
they may allow circumventing those controls. Even though Alternative Remittance Systems 
have been historically used for legal practices (remittances from expatriate workers, 
humanitarian/emergency aids, personal expenses), they are often used also for illicit activities, 
such as circumvention of capital and currency controls, customs and tax evasion, corrupt 
payments, financing terrorism, money laundering. As remittance volumes increase, authorities 
get more and more concerned about those potential risks. Countries should thus guarantee 
accessible but safe remittance systems by deeply understanding the market risks and 
preventing them (Todoriki et al., 2014). 
In 1996, the Financial Action Task Force recognized the potential misuse of the parallel 
banking system and included it in the list of ‘The money laundering techniques most 
frequently employed in the Asian region’ (FATF, 1996); these informal operators often carry 
out other business activities, which make it easier for them to engage in money laundering 
processes because it gets simpler to hide illegal money into lawful one. Moreover, increasing 
migration flows have contributed to the proliferation of underground bankers (both in terms 
of number and size) (Rees, 2010). Since terrorist attacks in 2001, regulatory authorities have 
started concerning about the use of Alternative Remittance Systems for financing terrorism as 
well.  
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Terrorist financing had already been mentioned in FATF reports in 1999, as an extension of 
anti-money laundering laws; the ‘terrorist related money laundering’ has however been 
treated as a real issue since 2001 (Vlcek, 2008). Increasing regulation and supervision of the 
official sector have definitely led people to use informal channels for criminal activities, 
hence international authorities have been pressing for regulating Alternative Remittance 
Systems. Countries have reacted in two different ways: some states opted for licensing 
informal operators (e.g. UAE); others instead chose to forbid them (e.g. Pakistan, India). 
Johnston (2005) however warns about the potential counterproductive effects of 
overregulation of the underground bank system, which may lead parallel bankers to move 
even more underground and disincentive Remittance Service Providers and formal financial 
institutions to provide remittance services because of higher compliance costs. In addition, an 
excessive level of regulation may leave expatriates with fewer and more expensive 
alternatives for sending remittances, which may in turn reduce the positive effect of 
remittances and reduce the possibilities to send fund for humanitarian and development 
purposes. As a result, prohibiting ARS is not an effective solution; a much better way to deal 
with ML/FT associated to informal system would be to ensure access for legitimate uses 
while preventing abuses (Passas, 2005).  
Complementary effects of strong AML/CFT Regime and improved financial inclusion 
Source: Todoriki et al., 2014. 
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Financial inclusion and reliable financial institutions are mutually dependent and must be the 
primary policymakers’ goals because they both contribute to economic progress. A reduced 
financial exclusion translates into lower money laundering and financing terrorism risks, but 
regulations imposed by certain countries makes financial inclusion a difficult goal to achieve 
(Todoriki et al., 2014). 
 
A. GENERAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
REGULATION 
 
Money laundering is a transnational crime concerning “a number of different jurisdictions 
with different legal standards” (Rider, Linklater and Bazley, 2009). Dirty money can have 
their origin or destination in any country, and the three stages to launder money may take 
place in three different states; countries having ineffective regulations are particularly subject 
to abuse and allow criminals intensifying their illicit activities. International authorities set 
standards and provisions but each country applies them in a different way: the different 
application of legislation and the presence of tax haven and banking secrecy countries 
exacerbate the defeat of illegal activities and make some nations more exposed to money 
laundering; effective and uniform regulation would thus have great advantages both at the 
country and at the international level (Schott, 2006).  
Regulations against money laundering and terrorism financing activities have been developed 
in these years, but different authorities still disagree on the most effective form of ruling and 
find it difficult to reach an uniform binding ruling for all countries; Mugarura (2011) claimed 
that criminals have learnt to abuse of countries’ different regulation to access new markets. 
Each country has its own ranking of legal sources to solve discrepancies and express 
supremacy among different laws; for example the US give supremacy of national law over 
international one, while France does the opposite (Keesoony, 2016). In 2014, FATF published 
a list of non-cooperative countries to warn institutions carrying out business in these 
jurisdictions to pay particular attention; the high-risk countries are Iran, Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Myanmar (FATF, 2014a); other countries 
(Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tanzania, Nepal) are instead “no longer subject to the 
FATF’s on-going global AML/CTF compliance process” thanks to their commitment to solve 
their deficiencies (FATF, 2014b).  
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Regulating informal operators is essential to respond to increasing money laundering and 
terrorism financing threats. The main goals of norms in this field are enhancing transparency 
by forcing record keeping and customer identification; it has been anyway emphasized that it 
is fundamental to prevent illicit use of informal intermediaries while still permitting their use 
for lawful purposes (e.g. remittances) (Rees, 2010). Indeed, FATF declared that “remittances 
are an important financial service for people in many developing countries and are a powerful 
enabler of financial inclusion. However, for AML/CFT purposes, it is important that financial 
products and services, including MVTS, are provided through financial institutions subject to 
adequate regulation in line with the FATF Recommendation. This will potentially reduce 
overall ML/TF risk in the financial system by bringing customers into the regulated sector. 
MVTS may be many customers’ first or only interaction with the financial sector. Therefore, 
a well-designed and functioning AML/CFT policy and supervisory framework for MVTS 
may foster greater financial inclusion.” (FATF, 2016). Hawala-like networks pose specific 
challenges to regulators: the main one is that transactions are not recorded and hence it is 
difficult to detect them (sometimes brokers give receipts with codes or symbols which may be 
hard to interpret); Hawaladars often carry out other business activities which must be 
analyzed separately from money transfer practices; cultural and social factors as well as 
traditions must be taken into account (Passas, 2005).  
It has been widely acknowledged that launderers and terrorist financers “take advantage of 
high speed international transfer mechanisms, such as wire transfers, to accomplish their 
goals”. International coordination is hence essential and many international bodies took part 
to the setting of standards (Schott, 2006). First, I will list some of the main international 
organizations which have been working on money laundering and terrorism financing 
prevention; then I will also report some regional bodies engaging in the same field.  
 
1. INTERNATIONAL BODIES PROVISIONS 
 
The United Nations. The United Nations was the first international entity to engage in 
money laundering prevention by setting up the so-called Global Programme Against Money 
Laundering (GPML) as part of its Drugs and Crime Office. It is worth noticing that this 
organization has the power to write down principles binding on all participant countries. In 
occasion of the Vienna convention, the United Nations initially included money laundering in 
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drug trafficking activities, but later deepened the subject in the Palermo Convention, whose 
article 18 requires mutual legal assistance among countries in cases of transnational crimes 
(Schott, 2006). 
The UN requires countries to prevent money laundering in banks and non-bank financial 
institutions through “beneficial owner identification, record-keeping and the reporting of 
suspicious transactions”; in particular they are required “to maintain such information 
throughout the payment chain and to apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do not 
contain complete information on the originator” (Art. 14). Moreover, article 58 suggests 
countries to “cooperate with one another for the purpose of preventing and combating the 
transfer of proceeds of offences” and “consider establishing a Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) to be responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the competent 
authorities reports of suspicious financial transactions.” Financial Intelligence Units were first 
set up in 1995 and formed the Egmont Group (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2004). 
As for countering terrorism financing, the UN created the Counter Terrorism Committee and 
adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing Terrorism, which 
required countries to defy any form of terrorism and promoted cooperation and information 
sharing among countries (Schott, 2006).  
 
The Financial Action Task Force. The Task Force in fact stated that the Forty 
Recommendations on money laundering together with the Nine Special Recommendations on 
terrorism financing must be considered as the basis for preventing, identifying and defeating 
the two criminal activities. FATF stated that “countries should criminalize money laundering 
on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 (the Palermo Convention).” (FATF, 2003). 
FATF standards for AML/CFT prevention include: customer identification; ongoing 
monitoring of accounts and transactions; record-keeping and reporting of suspicious 
transactions; internal controls and audit; integrity standards; cooperation between supervisors 
and other competent authorities (The Joint Forum, 2003). FATF’s main goal is to detect new 
forms of money laundering, which it publishes in its periodic Reports, and monitor whether 
the single states comply with its standards through self-assessments and mutual evaluations; 
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the criteria for these procedures have been jointly agreed by the FATF, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. In case some countries do not act in accordance with the 
above-mentioned Recommendations, FATF includes them in the list of Non Cooperative 
Countries and Territories (NCCTs) (Schott, 2006). Compliance is assessed for each 
Recommendation; the table below lists the possible ratings which a country can get.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Depository institutions must suspend or terminate any relationship with entities or individuals 
posing money laundering concerns. Some money transmitters have been therefore denied 
access to formal banks and so have lost access to accounts that they use to settle their 
balances; at the same time, money laundering and terrorism financing risks have made 
conventional banks lose some clients (Lawrance, 2016).  The Financial Action Task Force 
defines de-risking as the “phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting 
business relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than manage, risk in 
line with the FATF’s risk-based approach. De-risking can be the result of various drivers, 
such as concerns about profitability, prudential requirements, anxiety after the global financial 
crisis, and reputational risk. It is a misconception to characterize de-risking exclusively as an 
anti-money laundering issue.” (FATF, 2014c). The World Bank analyzed the size of de-
risking measures taken by banks and confirmed that some formal financial institutions are 
getting more and more reluctant to provide access to remittance providers. The de-risking 
trend has become more accentuated since 2010; the largest shares of MTOs account closures 
have been registered in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, the UK and the 
US. The World Bank however warned that some banks seemed to be excessively risk-averse 
with respect to customers operating in certain countries (The World Bank, 2015b); those 
Source: FATF, 2009. 
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institutions should rather adopt risk-based measures proportionate with their size and 
complexity, the risks they face and the kinds of customers that they serve (Todoriki et al., 
2014)  
 
 Customer identity verification  
Customers’ identification is essential for ensuring safe and sound financial operations (Schott, 
2006). Different international bodies (for instance the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the IOSCO and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors) have issued guidelines on Customer 
Due Diligence, which asks for more details than Know Your Customers (KYC) procedures 
(De Koker, 2006); however, financial institutions are mainly asked to comply with CDD 
standards provided by the FATF recommendations. These guidelines were first set in 1990 
“as an initiative to combat the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering drug 
money”, but they were later revised in 1996 to update with new money laundering methods 
and once again in 2003 when the Task Force added a glossary and interpretative notes to 
ensure a better understanding of the norms. Customer Due Diligence standards require 
financial institutions to verify both originator and beneficial owner’s identities and 
documents; in case the latter is a legal person, they must get proofs about its ownership and 
control structure. Moreover, the institutions must verify that transactions are consistent with 
the customer’s risk profile and business. The Task Force listed some circumstances in which 
institutions can apply simplified or reduced CDD measures, for example in situations 
presenting low risk of money laundering or terrorism financing or when the identity of the 
customer or beneficial owner is publicly available. As for record keeping, financial 
institutions are required to maintain trails about transactions for at least five years. (FATF, 
2003). 
 
 Suspicious Transaction Reporting 
Money transmitters must fill a suspicious transaction report whenever a transaction amounts 
to at least $2,000 and operators suspect it involves ML or TF; depository institutions are 
instead required to report suspicious activities in case of suspicious transactions equal to or 
above $5,000 (Lawrance, 2016).   
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 Recommendations on terrorist financing 
Terrorism financing consists of “encouraging, planning, assisting or engaging in acts of 
terrorism (…) to achieve economic and political destabilization and gain media attention” 
(Choo, 2013). Crain and Crain (2006) estimated that, if no terrorist attacks had taken place, 
the 2002 GDP of the 147 countries included in their survey might have been $3.6 trillion 
higher. 
Terrorists are often supported by money coming from legitimate sources such as donations 
and gifts; in case they are financed through dirty money, combating terrorism financing 
involves also anti-money laundering policies (Schott, 2006). 
In October 2001, FATF published eight special recommendations to counter terrorist 
financing and added the ninth three years later. It recommended that any bodies subject to 
AML obligations report suspicious transactions to authorities and asked countries to require 
Informal Operators to be licensed or registered, otherwise they should impose sanctions; 
moreover these intermediaries are required to report any available information about the 
money transfer originators. Countries must also make sure that non-profit organizations are 
not used for financing terrorism (FATF, 2001). The Interpretative Note to Special 
Recommendation VI states that “licensing means a requirement to obtain permission from a 
designated competent authority in order to operate a money/value transfer service legally. 
Registration (...) means a requirement to register with or declare to a designated competent 
authority the existence of a money/value transfer service in order for the business to operate 
legally.” (FATF, n.a.). According to Shah, “Licensing is the optimal method of assuring 
persons of dubious background and intentions are not allowed legal operating status, while the 
more minimalist registration approach at least allows regulatory and law enforcement 
agencies a straightforward way of contacting IFTS operators for both specific investigations 
and research opportunities.” (Shah, 2007). 
 
Basel Committee On Banking Supervision. As I previously wrote, money laundering and 
terrorism financing generally involve various jurisdictions and this fact makes it difficult to 
detect them at national level. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created just 
to ensure an international oversight on banks regulation, hence checking they maintain a good 
reputation while keeping their competitive position (Keesoony, 2016). In 1988, this 
Committee issued the Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of The Banking System for the 
Purpose of Money Laundering, containing guidelines aimed at preventing 
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the abuse of the banking system for money laundering. It defined Know-Your-Customer 
procedures as the core principles for defeating money laundering, it strongly suggested 
cooperation with law enforcement authorities and required both to close accounts whose 
funds are supposed to derive from criminal proceeds and to deny any transaction which is 
suspected to be related to money laundering activities. In 2003, it focused on parallel-owned 
banks, defined as “banks licensed in different jurisdictions that, while not being part of the 
same financial group for regulatory consolidation purposes, have the same beneficial 
owner(s), and consequently, often share common management and interlinked businesses”. It 
suggested international cooperation in order to share “information cross-border on the 
conditions of the bank and its compliance with banking laws and regulations” and on-site 
examinations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
 
International Organization Of Securities Commissions. In 1992, IOSCO published the 
Resolution on Money Laundering; in 2004, it issued the CIBO Principles (i.e. Client 
Identification and Beneficial Ownership) for the securities sector, requiring client or 
beneficial owner identification through Client Due Diligence method and the keeping of these 
data. Institutions dealing with securities must ask for financial background and business 
objectives of their customers in order to understand whether the transactions are consistent 
with their business profile (OICV-IOSCO, 2005).  
 
International Association Of Insurance Supervisors (Iais). This association was founded 
in 1994 by insurance supervisors from more than 100 countries. Its AML Guidance Notes, 
requiring insurance companies to comply with Anti-Money Laundering rules, are close to 
provisions for banks by the Basel Committee and entirely comply with FATF 
Recommendations (Schott, 2006). 
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2. REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
As for bodies operating at regional level, among the most important there are the Wolfsberg 
Group of Banks, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Organization of American States. 
FATF also created some more specific bodies called FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRB), 
which ensure compliance and harmonization at the regional level. Depending on the reference 
area, they have different names: Caribbean FATF; Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering; 
Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism ; Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group; FATF on Latin America; Middle East and North Africa FATF; Inter 
Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa; Task Force on 
Money Laundering in Central Africa; Eurasian Group. Some of them have published specific 
guidelines applying to their competence region (FATF-GAFI).  
 
III. SPECIFIC REGULATION FOR NON-BANK 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
Illegal activities through underground banks imply significant economic and social 
consequences, ranging from crime and corruption to the weakening of financial institutions 
(Liargovas and Repousis, 2011). Trehan (2003) reported the critical areas for action identified 
by the Indian working group: improvement of existing banking channels; cooperation in case 
of invoice manipulation; proper taxation laws; intelligence sharing; examination of existing 
law and use them in the best way to combat parallel banking use. 
FATF have enacted specific provisions for Money Transfer Businesses, i.e. recommendation 
1 on Risk-Based Approach, recommendation 14 on Money or Value Transfer Services, 
recommendation 16 on Wire Transfers, recommendation 10 on Customer Due Diligence, 
recommendation 11 on Record Keeping, recommendation 20 on Suspicious Transaction 
Reporting, recommendation 18 on Internal Controls and Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries, 
recommendation 35 on Sanctions (Todoroki et al., 2014). Specifically, the FATF recommends 
countries to adopt “measures to ensure that natural or legal persons that provide money or 
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value transfer services (MVTS) are licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant measures called for in the FATF 
Recommendations. Countries should take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry 
out MVTS without a license or registration, and to apply appropriate sanctions.” It however 
reminds that “MVTS play an important role in supporting financial inclusion [i.e.] providing 
access to an adequate range of safe, convenient and affordable financial services to 
disadvantaged and other vulnerable groups, including low income, rural and undocumented 
persons, who have been underserved or excluded from the regulated financial sector at an 
affordable cost in a fair and transparent manner. It is also about making a broader range of 
financial services available to individuals who currently may have access to only basic 
financial products.” (FATF, 2016). As for the Risk-Based Approach, MTVS agents have to 
assess money laundering and terrorism financing risk through some indicators, which take 
into account such factors as:  
 The nature and the complexity of their activities, including the volume of transactions 
that they carry out 
  Their target markets;  
 The customers’ profiles and the share of those considered as high risk;  
 The features of jurisdictions in which they provide services; in particular they shall 
analyze the frequency of crime and corruption, the level of regulation and law 
enforcement, the occurrence of anti-money laundering/counter financing terrorism 
controls; 
 The distribution channels, together with the payment string, the settlement systems, 
the technology used.  
In case of suspicious transactions, MTVS have to fill in a Suspicious Transaction Report. In 
2012, FATF introduced a Risk-Based Approach (RBA) to assess the overall risk associated to 
specific transactions; the task force in fact primarily aims at deterring and preventing ML and 
TF rather than at imposing sanctions. Risk assessment is mandatory in order to be fully 
compliant with FATF Recommendations and makes MTVS operators aware of their exposure 
to money laundering or terrorism financing operations. The FATF Risk evaluation 
methodology takes into consideration various kinds of risks: 
 geographic risk: transactions from/to countries particularly vulnerable to criminal 
activities or subject to sanctions for non-compliance with AML regulation;  
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 customer risk: transactions made by people or institutions which have been sanctioned 
by FATF or whose identity is uncertain, but also when they do not provide consistent 
information about the beneficiary or they are suspected doing transactions for third 
parties; 
 product and service risk: when customers prefer anonymous payment instruments or 
choose products easily exchangeable in cash; 
 agent risk: relates to distribution channels and include the risk associated to 
transactions from/to high-risk countries, to agents not willing to share and provide 
information, or whose profits do not correspond to their business profile and risk.  
(FATF, 2016). 
General AML/CFT provisions include registration or licensing, Customer Due Diligence, 
record keeping and Suspicious Transaction Reporting; some countries impose additional 
requirements to Money Transfer System, ranging from prudential rules (capital or 
organizational requirements), to exchange controls and consumer protection provisions. 
Registration and licensing regime also imply some significant country differences. In 
countries which chose the former system, Remittance Service Providers must provide many 
information to authorities and requirements to get the authorization may often vary, but do not 
usually include AML/CFT compliance before the authorization is granted; RSPs are hence 
sometimes asked to renovate their registration, which is renewed only if operators have been 
complying with all the requirements. The registration procedure is hence faster and cheaper 
than that for licensing, but from the point of view of authorities, it may translate in higher 
supervisory costs. On the contrary, asking for a license means being subject to more 
restrictions: authorities examine due diligence process, suitability, structure of the business, 
operational context and operating systems, compliance with AML/CFT regulations. All these 
assessments impede some operators to enter the market because they have to show ex-ante 
their compliance with rules (Todoriki et al., 2014).  
 
CASE STUDIES  
Passas (2006) argued that US “[fought] terror with error” because it imposed a too strict 
regulation on informal financial system, which then resulted in a greater exposure of those 
systems to abuse and made remittances more expensive to people really needing those funds. I 
will hence examine how some countries have reacted to pressure for increasing regulation of 
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the informal financial sector. Each jurisdiction implement its own policies concerning 
requirements, enforcement, sanctions and so on; these differences result in countries 
forbidding ARS, countries requiring licensing or registration and countries not regulating 
these systems (Rusten, 2011).  
I will now focus on two countries that the US Department of State have defined as 
“Jurisdictions of primary concern” about money laundering and terrorist financing (US 
Department of State, 2015). 
United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become an increasingly 
important regional hub for trade and financial activity thanks to its economic development, 
political stability and liberal business environment counting 36 Free Trade Zones; Dubai is a 
primary international banking and trading center and has been acknowledged to be part of the 
Hawala Triangle. Since most banks are branches of foreign financial institutions and 
immigrants constitute a large share of its labor force (about 80% of the population is made up 
by foreigners), informal networks are very popular. Hawala networks are often used to 
finance terrorists living in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia or to traffic narcotics coming 
from Southwest Asia; however, the UAE are universally known for illegal activities involving 
gold and diamonds.  
In 2002, the country organized the first International Conference on Hawala led by its 
Central Bank, which established AML rules requiring Hawaladars to register and comply with 
CDD, keeping records (including those of reverse transactions) and provide STR (Suspicious 
Transaction Reports); any transaction reports must be sent to the Central Bank on a quarterly 
basis (Trautsolt and Johnson, 2012). Registration allows them to make legal use of the 
traditional banking system; actually, only a small part of these brokers applied for the 
registration certificate but they anyway recur to the formal banking system without 
restrictions. The UAE Banking Supervision and Examination Department thinks that “the 
absence of any STRs reflects the fact that Hawaladars’ customers are typically people who are 
known personally to them through family or business contacts” and this fact make authorities 
think that suspicious transactions are privately solved, i.e. within the community, rather than 
through reporting to authorities (FATF, 2008, p. 106). 
In 2004, the UAE government and Central Bank organized a second conference on Hawala, 
which involved also the International Monetary Fund. The three authorities once again 
concluded that they needed to gather information on Hawaladars’ operations and enhance 
regulation (Johnston, 2005). Trautsolt and Johnson (2012) claim that AML and CFT 
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provisions in the UAE do not seem to have reduced criminal activities because “the regulatory 
and supervisory approach seems to ignore the local context with its religious, cultural, and 
social characteristics”. 
In 2014, the government issued new AML measures saying that people moving from/to the 
UAE must declare any convertible financial instrument or precious metal that they are 
carrying and the amount of money they have; moreover, the Central Bank was authorized to 
suspend suspicious bank accounts (US Department of State, 2015). 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been increasingly threatened by terrorist financing, money 
laundering, cash smuggling, abuse of informal value transfer systems, and other illicit 
activities. It is among the biggest narcotics producing and trafficking country and the largest 
opium producer and exporter in the world. In the last few years, the increasing size of illegal 
activities and of corruption level have caused the contraction of the formal banking sector, 
which is used by less than 10% of the country’s population, meaning that about 90% of 
financial transactions is run through the informal sector, whose leader is the Hawala network; 
some NGOs and international aid institutions have also addressed to Hawaladars since the 
formal banking system is not entirely operational. Actually, the formal and informal sector are 
not well separated one from the other because Hawaladars have accounts at banks and settle 
their books through banks’ wire transfers, and banks send funds through Hawala when money 
must be sent to areas where they do not operate (US Department of State, 2015). 
Spreading corruption makes the enforcement of AML provisions very hard; for instance, the 
country’s FIU stated that no operators submitted Suspicious Transaction Reports and many 
categories are not even supervised (e.g. dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers, 
accountants, real estate agents). New rules impose $20,000 as a threshold to amounts which 
can be transported outside the country, but they simultaneously abolished the requirement of 
outbound currency reporting and provide most of cargos with inspection exemptions. 
Regulation against terrorism financing allows the government to take hold of terrorist assets 
but there is no clear instructions on how these procedures work and no assets have been 
seized up to now. The lack of effective and clear regulation results in a large share of 
unregistered operators, since they are not threatened by sanctions (US Department of State, 
2015). 
 
Afghanistan experience demonstrates that regulation failed due to the government lacking 
capacity of implementing rules. UAE was more successful but did not take into account the 
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cultural and social factors related to the use of Hawala systems (Trautsolt and Johnson, 2012). 
Moreover, complying with new rules translates into higher costs because operators may need 
new technology or more employees taking care of reporting and identification procedures. 
Compliance costs are generally higher in countries where people are less used to comply with 
rules, such as Afghanistan; the best line of attack would hence be to make compliance easier 
and cheaper (Isern et al., 2005). Some studies found out that good quality of national 
regulation is the basis for encouraging compliance, while spreading corruption definitely 
discourage it. In a few words, we can say that compliance is strictly linked to the countries’ 
economic development and to the strength of AML/CFT standards; these must be stricter the 
more the country is vulnerable to ML/FT (Verdugo Yepes, 2011). 
 
IV. ENTERING IN THE REMITTANCE MARKET: THREATS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
The total annual remittances volumes account for billions of dollars and, as migration flows 
are increasing, money transfers are likely to surge as well; remittance market is hence a 
growing, multi-billions dollars market. Individuals have historically chosen to remit money 
through money transmitters, but the formal financial sector should try to take part to this 
business both to reduce the usage of informal networks, and hence ML risks, and to expand 
the sources of revenues. Remittance industry however does not coincide with banking 
industry because the two businesses have different targets: the former addresses to low-
income individuals, while the latter aims at providing services to high-net worth persons. The 
strict regulation previously imposed only to the formal sector have reduced the cases of abuse 
in the official system, so, if more transactions were made through traditional financial 
institutions, ML and FT risks would shrink (Todoroki et al., 2014). To achieve the goal of 
expanding into the remittance market, banks should first find out the facts causing the 
informal sector to continue to play a dominant role in the field and policymakers should 
analyze the reasons for choosing IVT systems from the customers’ point of view.  
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Underground banks provide essential services on a global basis, and this is why outlawing 
them is not a desirable solution; informal banking networks should be rather incorporated in 
the formal system. Besides lacking transaction records, the main issue relating to the use of 
Alternative Remittance Systems is that money transfers are in cash, which facilitates criminal 
practices by ensuring anonymity. Payment instruments should be chosen on the basis of the 
competition level in the financial industry, but cash is the only tool providing hedging from 
crisis and working in absence of electronic networks (Passas, 2016). 
While low charges and large accessibility seem to be the key advantages of informal operators 
with respect to banks, fees might not differ that much when comparing ARS with corporate 
remitters (i.e. Money Transfer Companies). Although the latter categories definitely has to 
incur in higher costs due to corporate expenses, most of them have been trying to contain 
those overheads to gain competitive positions; unfortunately, informal operators continue 
enjoying cost advantages because of the very simple technology required for their operations 
(internet/fax/telephone), enabling them to operate also in uncertain conditions. The main 
issues however are those related to cultural, social and religious characteristics of ethnic 
banks (Rees, 2010). Hariharan (2012) claimed that formal banks could learn how to serve 
poor communities and worker expatriates by imitating the features making the informal 
system so attractive for these individuals, but it is very difficult for Money Transfer Operators 
to get over social matters. We cannot forget that, in an Islamic community, whenever men 
migrate, their wives cannot have any contact with unfamiliar people, meaning that they cannot 
even go to banks; Hawaladars may therefore be a great alternative since they are usually 
known by people living in the area and are aware of local customs (Rees, 2010). Therefore, 
Degree of Formality of Remittances among Bilateral Remittance Corridor Analysis Case 
Studies 
Source: The World Bank. Retrieved from Todoriki et al., 2014. 
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provided that ARS maintain their characteristics, corporate remitters will have to struggle 
hard to take business away from informal operators (Rees, 2010).   
Shifting to official banking system definitely needs the support of governments, which should 
set up adequate policies providing incentives to both people and formal financial institutions; 
this would barely occur in underdeveloped or developing countries, since most of them are 
characterized by inefficient and corrupted classes of politicians, absence of regulatory 
frameworks for financial institutions and payment infrastructures, and may be affected by 
conflicts, natural catastrophes, economic crisis, economic sanctions and other unfavorable 
conditions (Rees, 2010). All these factors cause many individuals to be unbanked: taking 
Pakistan as an example, 50% of its residents have no access to any financial intermediary 
(neither formal nor informal), 30% have access to the informal system and 14.3% have access 
to the formal financial system. The high rates of unbanked individuals led to oblige Pakistani 
banks to offer Basic Bank Account for low-income people. Access to financial services (e.g. 
credit, insurance, remittances) allows people to reduce exposure to income fluctuations and 
promotes investments (Nenova, Niang and Ahmad, 2009); however many factors continue 
acting as barriers to financial services access for the population of poorest countries, e.g. 
limited literacy, lack of infrastructures, high commission charges, lack of knowledge of 
banking operations (Chatain et al., 2011). 
Official financial intermediaries of many countries are not willing to expand in the remittance 
market mainly because of the lack of proper technology and financial products (Nenova, 
Niang and Ahmad, 2009). However, if informal players were integrated into the formal 
system, the level of competition would be much higher and would hence contribute to 
improve efficiency; enhanced efficiency would then translate into low charges for customers, 
new technologies and the introduction of new products and services (Todoroki et al., 2014). 
Maimbo (2007) analyzed the likely benefits of the integration of formal and informal financial 
sector in countries going through wars: although conflicts often imply deficiencies of both the 
payment system and of government regulation and oversight, countries may dispose of 
informal financial networks, including those of microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives 
and mobile Money Transfer Operators. Hariharan (2012) proposed to enter the financial 
industry of a post-conflict country by using its existing networks and imitating their 
operations; in a few words, he suggested to set up “Hawala-inspired techniques” to make 
formal sector remittances services easy to reach by a larger share of population. Conventional 
banks should hence provide more efficient and accessible services, adapt their banking 
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procedures, integrate informal operators and take into consideration cultural differences when 
setting up their business strategies.  
Increasing competition has stimulated many Remittance Service Providers to expand their 
product and service range and to tailor them on migrants’ needs; banks may enjoy of a wide 
range of technologies permitting to customize products and services as well, but each solution 
pose specific ML/FT risks which must be attentively analyzed and mitigated. In Pakistan, 
Western Union has entered into partnerships with various banks, exchange companies and the 
country postal network and, in 2006, it presented a remittance card (Suriname) containing all 
the information about the holders (Nenova, Niang and Ahmad, 2009). 
Some American banks created partnerships with foreign ones and allow remittances between 
accounts of partner banks; examples of these agreement are those of Citizens Bank targeted to 
New England’s Cape Verdean population, Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of America, whose 
main target is Mexican immigrants (Getter, 2015). Nigerian banks started paying out 
remittances both in foreign and local currency because many people want to withdraw funds 
in U.S. dollars, while many Mexican financial institutions have been considering accounting 
for clients’ remittance history in risk assessments for loans. Likewise, Banco Industrial in 
Guatemala has started providing short-term credit for home restructuring asking for a 
guarantee based on future remittance flows. Other institutions set up Internet-Based 
Remittance Transfers, which allows using prepaid cards to withdraw money in any ATM. 
However, ATMs are usually present mainly in urban areas rather than in rural ones, so it 
won’t help in attracting unbanked individuals living in remote areas and it also may imply 
higher ML/FT risks whenever providers do not investigate on both origin and destination of 
that money (Todoriki et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nenova, Niang, Ahmad, 2009. 
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Banks of other countries succeeded in entering the remittance market through mobile banking. 
Fathallah, Mino and Pickens (2011) report some data on the number of people having mobile 
phones in 2011, and he said that it was twice the amount of people having a bank account; 
therefore, banks may definitely exploit this growing opportunity, which can also be very 
helpful in countries experiencing conflicts, natural disasters etc. For example, after the 
earthquake hit Haiti in 2010, banks had to close; the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation hence 
launched the Haiti Mobile Money Initiative, whose main goal was to encourage 241 banks and 
mobile operators to introduce mobile banking services (Bold, 2011).Mobile money transfer 
services include mobile banking services (i.e. self-service banking transactions such as 
checking account balance, transferring funds to other accounts, making payments using 
mobile phone), mobile payment services (allow using the value stored on the mobile for 
payments) and mobile remittance services (domestic or international money transfers via 
SMS) (Choo, 2013). Notwithstanding many successful cases, banks are still reluctant to 
expand their activity to mobile phone services because they think to them as a plus for 
existing customers, rather than a way for serving the unbanked and hence enlarging their 
clientele (Ivatury and Mas 2008). 
In the Philippines, Globe launched the so-called G-Cash, which allows maintaining deposits 
and transferring money through mobile phones. Since October 2004, users have thus enjoyed 
a new and cheap method for making and receiving payments by using e-wallets via SMS 
without needing to have prepaid cards or bank accounts (Owens and Bantug-Herrera, 2006). 
In 2009, G-Cash enjoyed a market penetration in the Philippines equal to 82% and counted 65 
million subscribers. According to Proenza (2007), G-Cash had such a great success because of 
the Philippines large urban population and text messaging culture. Any individual wanting to 
move money through G-Cash has to load his own mobile wallet by giving cash to the operator 
or one of its partners, who turn it into virtual money, or by transferring money from bank 
accounts.  When remitting money through G-Cash, senders go to Globe partners, where they 
have to show their ID, fill in a form and pay the fee, which varies according to the amount 
transferred. It is not necessary that receivers are Globe customers: it is sufficient that senders 
provide recipients’ phone number so that they get a SMS notifying about the transaction and 
giving them the Reference Code to show to operators in order to withdraw the money. Even 
individuals not owning a mobile phone can get remittances through G-Cash service (Globe 
Telecom website). In 2007, a similar m-payment product called M-Pesa was launched in 
Kenya by Safaricom (which is part of Vodafone): M stays for mobile, while Pesa is the 
Swahili for cash. The product was not part of Vodafone core business, neither it was 
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introduced in a core market but M-Pesa spread very quickly: 14 months after its introduction, 
it already counted almost 3 million users. This great success has corresponded to a coincident 
great increase of remittance (Flores-Roux and Mariscal, 2010). Through M-Pesa, Safaricom 
and its partners accept deposits to any subscriber owning its SIM card, which in turn get e-
float (i.e. e-money); partner stores get a commission from Safaricom for every conversion of 
money into e-float. The electronic money can be transferred among M-Pesa accounts via SMS 
or sold back to Safaricom in exchange for money. Originally M-Pesa was born for remitters 
but later has extended its services to goods and services payments. Fees are charged both to 
senders and to receivers whenever they withdraw money (Jack and Suri, 2011). According to 
Fernandes (2015), M-Pesa success factors are the very high fees charged by any other kind of 
remittance/payment provider, the dominant market position of Safaricom, a successful slogan 
(“Send money home”), the inefficiency of the local banking system and, last but not least, the 
post-election violence in Kenia in 2008 which pushed people to use M-PESA both to send 
money to people stuck in Nairobi's shantytowns and to store money in a place other than 
banks, which were involved in disputes (Fernandes, 2015). 
The Philippines experience with G-Cash and the Kenyan M-Pesa however witness that 
traditional banks may successfully offer financial service to the unbanked through mobile 
banking strategies; their success derives also from the very low costs that what Ivatury and 
Mas (2008) call branchless banking have to incur when deciding to serve the poorest segment 
of population: physical presence is not needed so they can easily reach large shares of 
population.  
Equity Bank in Kenya, Tameer Bank in Pakistan, and XacBank in Mongolia have entered the 
mobile money market; evidence however shows that mobile banking strategies are often 
launched and led by mobile operators instead of banks (Ivatury and Mas 2008). The main 
difference between the two is that mobile operators enable customers to remit money through 
their mobile devices, while banks usually allow making payments which are debited from the 
customers’ bank accounts or credit cards (Choo, 2013). 
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Introducing mobile payments in new markets may not be easy. Individuals living in 
developing countries look for the most convenient method to transfer and withdraw funds but 
ATMs and other basic elements may not be in place, hence requiring high initial sunk costs 
(Kendall, Schiff and Smadja, 2014). Besides, potential providers must take into account that 
mobile money is not ML/FT risk free, but it is still safer than cash because transactions are 
always recorded. Users are usually identified, but issues may arise whenever customers use 
false names (they do not have to show ID cards because the whole process is electronically 
carried out); whenever transactions involve non-identified clients, authorities can however 
make use of phone lists kept by providers. To overcome concerns related to the use of cash, 
mobile banking operators often impose caps on the frequency and the amount of money that 
can be transferred (Todoriki et al., 2014); indeed, ML and FT risks through mobile money is 
still low: evidence shows that criminals tend to choose other channels, also due to the high 
Examples of Branchless Banking Projects 
Source: Ivatury and Mas, 2008. 
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costs of carrying out criminal activities through mobile devices (Chatain et al., 2011). 
Notwithstanding these proofs, Levya (2010) warned that digital value smurfing may take 
place if mobile operators permitted customers to use digital stored value: as criminals would 
not need to deposit cash, they could get digital value in exchange for illicit money and they 
could immediately and quickly transfer that value anywhere in the world. 
Financial institutions looking for expansion opportunities should consider extending to Sub-
Saharan Africa, where most payments (including those of firms from government and 
customers, and to wholesalers and employees) are still in cash. These areas present features 
that are much different from those of other countries: first of all, most expenses are related to 
basic needs such as food, education, health and basic retail purchases; in addition, mobile 
phones are wide spreading (Kendall, Schiff and Smadja, 2014).  
Since IFTS have never stopped operating even in case of unstable conditions (opposite to 
traditional banks), we can reasonably conclude that formal banks should continue 
investigating and imitating the modus operandi of informal networks. Remittances market 
may be definitely attractive for banks for various motives: remittances are usually stable over 
economic cycles, so fees deriving from providing remittance services are likely to be stable 
over time; in addition, banks may provide financial education programs to remitters who can 
then be potential customers for other financial products and services. Getter (2015) however 
argued that formal institutions have to fill some gaps before entering the remittance market:  
 the trust gap: migrants frequently mistrust formal financial institutions; Watterson 
(2012) suggested filling this gap by directly promoting banks in places hosting large 
shares of immigrants and by accepting alternative forms of identification such as the 
Matricula Consular (i.e. an identity card given to undocumented workers living 
outside Mexico);  
 
 the information and education gap: banks do not usually know immigrants’ culture 
and hence cannot discriminate among different habits of different ethnic groups; 
likewise, immigrants lack knowledge of banking operations, products and services; 
 
 the product gap: banks do not provide products and services specifically target to 
immigrants’ needs. 
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After having filled those gaps, conventional banks may enhance their competitiveness by 
introducing new financial inclusion methods, such as the above mentioned mobile banking, 
but also by presenting themselves as reliable institutions (Getter, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acceptable Documents for Verification 
(% of surveyed countries) 
Source: Todoriki et al., 2014. 
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CHAPTER 4: REMITTANCES TO CHINA AND 
THE COUNTRY'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
‘‘Around the world, there is no other market like the market in 
China that highlights a convergence trend of Internet and 
mobility.’’ 
- YuanKe Deng, Vice president of Nokia Global 
 
 
I. CHINESE FACTS AND FIGURES 
 
China has been a communist planned economy for long time but since the 70s it has been 
implementing economic reforms which have turned the country to a socialist market 
economy. Many state-owned firms are still present, but there are many private companies as 
well. The main economic changes due to Reforms were the reorganization of agriculture 
production, the distribution of land to households through the Household Responsibility 
System and the introduction of new and differentiated economic activities; all these factors 
caused the redistribution of rural population and the creation of new jobs, especially in the 
tertiary sector. Thanks to urban reforms, Chinese people had the possibility to carry out long 
distance trading activities and, as restrictions on population mobility were relaxed, they could 
move to cities and get temporary jobs there. Rural-to-urban flows started: the dramatic and 
quick surge in migration led to a huge increase in remittances that contributed to partially 
relocate wealth from cities to the countryside (Cai, 2003). 
In the 80s the country was ready to open to the world economy; in 2005, more than 44,000 
foreign invested enterprises were allowed to set up branches in China and the number quickly 
raised (FATF, 2007). In the same year, the Chinese government implemented the reform of 
the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate formation mechanism and the country experienced a fast 
rise of its foreign exchange reserves; as a result, short-term speculative capital in the 
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international financial market (hot money) were destined to the Chinese capital and real estate 
markets with the goal of gaining from asset price increases (Li, Liu, and Ge, 2012). 
Because of the widespread of the financial crisis consequences, in the last few years China 
has been suffering for the consequences of the worldwide economic downturn, which has 
impaired global trade and has caused amazing effects on stock market indexes. China has 
primarily suffered of FDIs and exports contraction and the government has responded with a 
$586 billion stimulus package devoted to infrastructure improvement and similar programs. 
The government agenda has definitely boosted investments in fixed assets, especially by local 
governments, which borrowed from banks and shadow bank institutions (Hsu and Li, 2015). 
China’s GDP growth has considerably slowed down due to a decreasing growth in industrial 
production, investment and imports; growth has however steadied in the last couple of years. 
The total level of debt in 2014 reached the 282% of its GDP.  
 
China still exerts extensive capital controls but it is gradually losing them by allowing inflows 
and outflows of capital; these new arrangements aim at sustaining financial development and 
encouraging the free movement of capital; Shanghai Free Trade Zone was introduced in 2013, 
followed by those in Guangdong, Tianjin, and Fujian. China has tried to shift towards a 
flexible market-determined exchange rate; the RMB/US dollar exchange rate has hence been 
subject to market forces and has led to a lower pressure on RMB (Prasad, 2016). Expectations 
of Chinese currency appreciation have contributed to increase foreign debts well and, at some 
point, China reached the debt levels of countries hit by the crisis. The government reacted by 
enacting new policies requiring foreign-invested enterprises to manage only their own 
balance; this rule implies that multinational companies can declare to have extended their debt 
because of cash shortages  and short-term debt can be easily recycled. Foreign-invested 
enterprises can therefore introduce hot money through transfer pricing, inflating profits, short-
term debt and capital increases, which rule out any form of detection; likewise, Chinese-
invested enterprises established abroad can transfer hot money to China by reporting higher 
income than actual. Most of this hot money flows through underground banks and harm the 
country: the most relevant effects are the rising inflation, asset price bubbles and the higher 
need of monetary policy actions. As these consequences exacerbated when the Fed started 
Quantitative Easing policies in 2010, Chinese authorities enacted stringent measures to 
restrain the size of hot money inflows, but they were not so effective because most of that 
money flowed through informal channels (i.e. ARS) (Li, Liu, and Ge, 2012).In fact, many 
residents wanted to transfer money offshore because they believed that their money was safer 
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abroad and they could get higher returns: in order to circumvent capital controls, people 
addressed to underground bankers, whose enhanced activities translated into a decrease in 
forex reserves and made it more difficult for the country to stimulate growth because it had 
less money for investments (Chuin-Wei, 2015). 
 
The 2013 Annual Report of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange states that 
investigations led to the detection of “2,453 cases involving activities in violation of the 
regulations on foreign exchange administration” (SAFE, 2013). More recently, an article 
published by Bloomberg a few months ago reports that China imports from Hong Kong have 
significantly increased (+89% with respect to 2015); this fact has raised concerns about trade 
invoices manipulation aimed at routing capital out of the country because of fears of Yuan 
devaluation (Curran, 2016). 
 
II. CHINA MIGRATION FLOWS AND REMITTANCES 
 
Nowadays, China is fourth in the ranking of source of immigrants and the amount of 
remittances sent to China has increased proportionately to the increase of expatriate workers.  
Remittances of Chinese expatriates were fundamental in the years before and after the World 
Wars: besides providing economic support to poor families, remittances helped the country to 
reduce its trade deficit; in 1903, their amount corresponded to 168% of the trade deficit, so it 
is easy to understand the importance of remittances contribution to the fall of deficit. They 
played another important role during the Great Depression (1930s) because they did not drop 
as much as it was expected (as said in the previous chapters, remittances have a counter-
cyclical behavior) (Cheong, Lee and Poh, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternate estimates of Remittances to China and as shares of trade deficit, 1929-38 
Source: Cheong, Lee and Lee, 2014. 
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In the communist period after the Second World War (1950s), the government implemented 
strict controls on forex transactions, aiming at eliminating the foreign currencies’ black 
market. People willing to remit money to relatives tried to find alternative ways of 
transferring that money because the official RMB exchange rate was much higher than the 
prevalent rate in the black market; however, to prevent these practices, the Bank of China 
required that all remittances passed through its branches (Shiroyama, 2006). To evade the 
BOC controls, Chinese overseas transmitted money through clan-based networks of 
individuals and institutions, in turn constituted by Chinese people. I will later give details 
about the Chinese Alternative Remittance System. Moreover, during the planned economy 
period, the Chinese inhabitants were not permitted to move within the country. The society 
was clearly divided into rural and urban population and they could not shift from one category 
to the other.   
On the contrary, many residents were obliged to travel towards central and western China in 
the 60s and 70s, and towards cities during the Cultural Revolution (Cai, Du and Wang, 2009). 
Since the well-known rural-to-urban migration can be defined as a labor migration (it 
originated from Economic and Rural Reforms that caused labor surplus in the agricultural 
sector), workers were reallocated to higher productive sectors and those migration flows have 
therefore been the driver of China development. In the 80s, there were still some barriers to 
restrict labor mobility and the government encouraged rural Chinese to “leave the land 
without leaving the village (litubulixiang)”. A few years later, local farmers were given the 
right to move for business reasons for the first time and rural-to-urban migration became a 
huge phenomenon: the urban to rural income per capita ratio was above 2.5 in 1978, so rural 
inhabitants strongly desired to move to cities. Starting from the 90s, China experienced a 
great economic growth that stimulated even more migration flows because of the high number 
of job vacancies; in 2007, migrant workers constituted almost half of the individuals working 
in cities. 
Migrant workers are still a fundamental source of income for their families staying in rural 
areas; remittances are therefore very important for making rural households a bit more 
wealthy and for reducing the income divergences within the society (Cai, Du and Wang, 
2009). Luo (2008) stated that, among the Reforms implemented in China, labor reallocation to 
non-agricultural sectors was the factor most contributing to the country’s growth, both 
because demand for land was lower (thus preventing land shortages and deterioration) and 
because of the great role of remittances in mitigating income fluctuations and in providing an 
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additional source of income that encouraged rural farmers to invest in more developed 
agricultural technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For these reasons, the People’s Bank of China has been engaging in developing innovative 
payment tools and in encouraging financial inclusion as well as financial education for 
migrants, including remittances literacy. The Central Bank, commercial banks, mobile 
network operators and payment service providers have therefore collaborated to extended 
financial infrastructures in order to be able to provide remittance services in rural and poorer 
areas. The 2015 Country Plan for decreasing remittance transfer costs included such goals as: 
 increasing competition among remittance providers by lowering the regulatory 
barriers for inflows and outflows; 
 improve financial infrastructures and introducing new technologies; 
 enhancing transparency and consumers’ protection (G20, 2015).   
ù 
 
 
Remittances and Migration by Continent 
Source: Human Development Report, 2009.Retrieved from Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 
Top 10 Remittance Flows to mainland China in 2014 
Source: World Bank Bilateral Remittance Data, 2014. Retrieved from G20, 2015. 
Retrieved from  
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III. ALTERNATIVES FOR MONEY TRANSFERS 
 
In 2012, remittances inflows to China 
exceed US $66 billion and constitute 
about the 80% of total flows to Eastern 
Asia. However, China’s remittance 
market is not adequately competitive and, 
as a result, it is the Asian country with 
the highest average transaction cost 
(9.83%) (IFAD, 2013). 
Money transfer to and from China can be 
accomplished through several kinds of 
institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks. Chinese state-owned banks (e.g. Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), Bank of Communications and Agricultural Bank of China) and some 
commercial banks (e.g. Merchants Bank of China, China Citic Bank and China Everbright 
Bank) provide money transfer services. Before concluding a bank transfer, banks ask for the 
receiver’s name, his account number (IBAN) and the SWIFT code; the transfer requires from 
one to five business days to be concluded and the sender is charged commissions usually 
corresponding to 0.1% of the amount transferred. Banks add foreign currency exchange fees 
whenever money are transferred to foreign bank accounts. In case foreign receivers do not 
own bank accounts, banks provide demand drafts, which are much faster and have a restricted 
validity (generally one year) (Olson, 2015). 
Remittance transfer cost as a percentage of total 
cost, by country and type of remittance provider 
Source: Orozco (2013). The Market for Money Transfers in 
Asia: Scorecard Report. Retrieved from IFAD, 2013. 
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Money Transfer Companies. Besides banks, money transfers can be accomplished by 
international Money Transfer Companies. Western Union is one of them: it cooperates with 
many Chinese banks and those agreements allow people to move money via Western Union 
by simply addressing to their cooperative banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Jilin, 
Bank of Wenzhou, Bank of Yantai, Construction Bank of China, Everbright Bank of China, 
Postal Saving Bank of China,…). The service is definitely fast because money is immediately 
available to receivers, who must show the “MTCN” number and their ID card in order to 
withdraw the sum; fees vary depending on the amount moved. Money Gram offer services 
very similar to those of Western Union and it cooperates with banks as well. It is important to 
underline that both Western Union and Money Gram accepts only US dollars and do not 
allow to move amounts greater than $9,999.99 (Olson, 2015). 
Post. Post offices are active players in the Asian remittance market and are particularly strong 
in China (IFAD, 2013). The Universal Postal Union (UPU) provides international postal 
money orders with a daily threshold equal to $1,500, which allow transferring money quickly 
among post offices in countries which signed UPU agreements. The information required are 
generally just the recipient’s name and his address (Olson, 2015). 
E-Transfers. As for electronic money transfers, the most common payment system is Alipay 
that permits to move even very large sum of money from Alipay accounts to foreign bank 
accounts. It is a multi-function app for mobile phones allowing to make payments in stores 
and online, but also to transfer money abroad. The main drawback of this system is that 
Alipay accounts can be open just by people owning Chinese visas and green cards, which 
foreigners usually do not have. The transfer requires three to five working days and money is 
converted into foreign currency by default. PayPal is a very similar system providing a virtual 
wallet and it is much more diffused around the world; it provides immediate virtual transfers 
between PayPal accounts, while it takes a few days if they are transferred to bank accounts 
(Josh, 2016).  
Alternative Remittance System. Finally, money transfers can be done via underground 
banks, which in China are called Fei ch’ien. 
I will now sketch some characteristics of the first and the last category.  
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A. THE CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM 
 
The People's Bank of China (PBC) was set up at the end of 1948 after the consolidation of  
the Huabei Bank, the Beihai Bank and the Xibei Farmer Bank; it was appointed as Central 
Bank just in 1983 and was later given three main functions: the formulation and 
implementation of the monetary policy, the banking supervision and regulation and the 
provision of payment settlement services (Sappideen and He, 2008). 
China’s banking system has historically been both owned and controlled by the government, 
but since the economic reforms in 1978, the country has sought to renovate the system, which 
was isolated from the international market, and only four banks have been kept under the state 
control. All the other banks have been given incentives to act in a more competitive way and 
the system has been progressively converted into a competitive market counting various kinds 
of banks, including foreign ones; nevertheless, the government still represents a major equity 
holder in most banks and is hence able to restrict their autonomy by exercising a substantial 
influence on the investment choices and operations of the institutions (Martin, 2012). Starting 
from 2001, the Chinese banking system was made up of four wholly state-owned commercial 
banks, three policy-lending banks, more than one hundred commercial banks, three thousands 
urban credit cooperatives, almost two hundreds foreign banks (Schueller, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organization of Chinese Financial System at the end of 1994 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1995. 
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Nowadays, China counts three main kinds of banks differing for operations and ownership 
structures: wholly state-owned banks (i.e. the Industry and Commercial Bank of China, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China and the Construction Bank of 
China),“equitized” commercial banks and local banks. The Chinese banking system has some 
specific features distinguishing it from foreign systems: first of all, loans constitute a large 
part of assets and are mostly granted to companies, while the liability side of the balance sheet 
is predominantly constituted by deposits; moreover, both assets and liabilities have very low 
ratings (Simwayi and Guohua, 2011).  
China also counts many illegitimate banks (shadow banks and underground banks) that offer 
higher deposit rates but also allow hiding money, therefore constituting a privileged channel 
to transfer money abroad illegally (Martin, 2012). The shadow baking sector has been 
expanding because of the mismatch between demand and supply of credit and savings 
products, but also because of the strict regulations on the formal banking system imposing 
controlled interest rates and high levels of reserve requirements on deposits. Moody’s 
estimated that shadow banking assets correspond to 65% of Chinese GDP (Prasad, 2016). 
The payment process is defined as "first-horizontal (interbank) and then-vertical (intrabank)" 
because payments are primarily cleared and settle through the local clearinghouse and then 
intrabank; the Chinese payment system in fact consists of three main sub-systems: 
 the National Electronic Interbank System (NEIS): it takes care of clearing and 
settlement on a national basis and limit the credit and liquidity risk exposure of 
recipient banks by debiting the sender banks’ account before routing payments. 
 local clearing houses (LCHS): they take care of such transactions as exchange, bill and 
cheque within the same region 
 Commercial banks' intra-bank payment systems. 
 
The PBC settles accounts only when net accounts equal zero (Sappideen and He, 2008). 
 
IV. UNDERGROUND BANKING IN CHINA 
 
The rising value of the Yuan, the growing economy and the stringent capital controls 
constitute the main elements for explaining the wide use of underground banks in China 
(Chen, 2007). Funds transfers within China indeed take place mainly through underground 
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banks or companies controlled by them: the most used informal and unregulated channels are 
cargo trade, service trade, and direct investment. 
The main business of the underground banks is to provide remittance and currency exchange 
services and hence constitutes a network for secretly transferring money to the more 
developed regions and trade areas of China. In the country, there are different kinds of 
underground money houses:  
 Underground agents operating as branches of overseas informal money transfer 
institutions providing remittance services; 
 Underground banks operated by  
1. commercial companies, which make transactions with foreign commercial 
companies in order to transfer money by simulating trading activities 
2. foreign investment and foreign trade companies 
3. normal shops, such as grocery stores, cafe bars and restaurants; these are what 
we call Fei chi’ en (Chu, 2008).  
Fei chi’en (i.e. flying money) is also known Ch’iaohui (i.e. overseas remittance) and 
Huik’uan (to remit sums of money) in Mandarin, or Nging Sing Kek (i.e. money letter shop) 
in Cantonese. It has widely spread in China, Hong Kong and Thailand, where it takes the 
name Phoe Kuan. The network was probably born during the T’ang Dinasty (565-909 After 
Christ) as a payment tool for exchanging tea within the country, which was a commercial and 
trade center (Shehu, 2004). The network allowed transferring money without physically 
moving it, therefore avoiding the risk of theft or loss. In the 19
th
 century, many Chinese 
people emigrated abroad (so-called Chinese diaspora) and the Fei ch’ien started being used as 
a remittance system (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). As migrants moved abroad looking 
for a job, they belonged to a sort of “dual family” because they had one family in China and 
one in their new town. They regularly sent remittances back home in order to maintain ties 
with their origin families in case they had to go back to China because of unemployment 
(Purcell, 1951). Underground banking was particularly useful for people who opened “high-
value” shops abroad, such as gold shops, because they could easily conceal their income 
(Cassidy, 1994). 
The system is also well-known as Chit banking (deriving from Chitty, i.e. a Hindi word 
referring to a mark) because British Colonialists used to give servants a piece of paper 
containing symbols (usually animals) as a form of certificate. These documents are still used 
as receipts but they are conserved just until the conclusion of the transfer and then wasted 
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(Shehu, 2004). Lambert (2002) reported that, many years ago, a Hong Kong Police official 
told that “he found a piece of paper with the picture of an elephant on it that represented the 
collection of a receipt for U.S. $3million at a Hong Kong gold shop”. Another common name 
for the Chinese underground banking is Chop: a chop is a seal stamped in a stone or wood 
indicating ownership of goods, goods or cash delivery, or goods acknowledgement (i.e. the 
chop is put on the invoice by the receiver as soon as goods are delivered). Finally, chops can 
be printed on banknotes to ascertain ownership (Cassidy, 1994). 
Fei chi’en systems have the same trust-feature of Hawala networks: Fei chi’en operators 
usually belong to families that have been working in the banking field for generations and, 
since they have to maintain the good name of their families, they are considered as reliable 
people. Chinese society have in mind the idea of guanxi, which refers to the basic relationship 
in individuals’ networks of influence (i.e. the relationships among individuals); the Confucian 
culture puts emphasis on the importance of trust and mutual obligations as basic factors for 
establishing guanxi networks. On the other hand, Chinese ARS presents also some differences 
from Hawala: when settling accounts, import or export manipulation is much less common in 
Fei chi’en; chit trails are more common in China rather than in Arabic countries, where 
underground bankers generally use codes; Fei chi’en is typically a one-way system (towards 
China), while Hawala moves funds both in and out each state (Shehu, 2004). Informal Value 
Transfer Systems operating in Hong Kong are similar to those operating in the whole China, 
but they are known as Unregulated (or Unlicensed) Remittance Centers (URCs). These 
centers are usually located in shops, trading companies, guest houses or even private houses, 
and provide money transfer services overseas through parent companies located in those 
jurisdictions (Passas, 1999).  
Passas (1999) interviewed Willard Myers, Director of Center of Asian Studies, who described 
the two components of Chinese underground banking: one is obviously the customer who is 
willing to send money to another individual and needs to convert his money into foreign 
currency; the other component is the banker, who instead wants to get foreign exchange 
without being subject to government controls. 
Addressing to underground banks is quite common in China. Fielding (1993) blamed 
discrimination against the Chinese population as a factor contributing to the popularity of 
informal systems in the Western countries: the British closed some of the Asian banks in the 
UK, so that the Asian population living there had to address to informal bankers. The reasons 
why the Chinese continue choosing Alternative Remittance Systems rather than traditional 
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banks are the same listed in the second chapter (i.e. speed, cost effectiveness, efficiency, 
anonymity..), but the primary motivation for using Fei chi’en is the mania of Chinese 
individuals to hide their wealth (Shehu, 2004). A post on Save on Send reports the result on 
investigations about the reasons why so many Chinese prefer remitting money by addressing 
to informal channels rather than licensed money transmitters. They found that this choice 
derives from a combination of historical background, cultural characteristics and current 
trends in China; more specifically: 
 Trust is a key factor in Chinese culture and, since Chinese fear losing their wealth, 
non-Chinese companies are still considered as suspicious; 
 Chinese government imposes restrictions on the amount of money that can be 
transferred every year, and has therefore set up a database of all incoming transactions. 
As a result, the Chinese formal financial sector is not able to satisfy all the foreign 
exchange requests because of the restrictions on foreign currency conversion; ethnic 
banks are instead able to easily match demand and supply for foreign exchange 
because they are not licensed by the government and can therefore circumvent capital 
controls (Shehu, 2004). 
 Chinese citizens receiving money from abroad must pay taxes on it, so they pass 
money through unofficial channels; moreover, Chinese people tend to be very 
secretive about their income and wealth for safety and reputation reasons, so they 
choose channels allowing avoiding reporting their earnings (SaveOnSend, 2016). 
An article published by Reuters reports that in 2015 “China underground banks did more than 
1 trillion Yuan ($152 billion) in transactions” deriving from the great amount of capital 
outflows due to the country’s stagnation and market volatility (Blanchard, 2016). Chinese 
Alternative Remittance Systems usually transfer money through various methods, mainly 
involving foreign exchange transactions (foreign currency smuggling, non-resident foreign 
exchange settlement, financial institutions’ business transactions), fake trading transactions 
(reporting higher export and lower import prices, advance export payments) or fraudulent 
foreign investment. Since, as I said before, ARS offer more convenient exchange rates, 
Chinese Informal Value Transfer Systems largely engage in foreign exchange transactions to 
transfer funds abroad on behalf of companies and private. Recently, China’s foreign trade has 
rapidly developed, implying a great increase in trade frauds; hence, the Alternative 
Remittance System has progressively increased to use false reporting of import and export 
prices, advance and delayed payments, and false trade contracts to send funds abroad (Li, Liu, 
and Ge, 2012). 
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The Chinese underground banking system has primarily expanded in Shantou and Chaozhou, 
that are coastal cities where many enterprises choose to set up; they are also close to Hong 
Kong and Macau, which enjoy more open financial systems. Large amounts of money are 
often distributed among several bank accounts controlled by underground bankers and then 
transferred out of mainland China. Another common practice by underground bankers is the 
matching of Yuan with corresponding amounts in foreign currency (Chuin-Wei, 2015). 
 
V. OTHER FORMS OF PAYMENTS AND MONEY 
TRANSFERS 
 
In the last few years, China has experienced a great development of its mobile payment and 
clearing system; just to give an idea, in 2008, Chinese internet users exceeded the US ones 
and in2014, the electronic payment services amounted to 33 million, corresponding toҰ140 
billion. The constant economic growth has led to increasing business activities, including 
online trades (both business-to-business and retail). The rising use of this form of payments 
however alarmed the anti-money laundering organization, which enacted some guidelines 
about mobile payment and clearing (Wang andOu, 2015; To and Lai, 2014).  
In 2004, the Bank of Communications introduced a Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) 
mobile banking services and later, Chinese biggest banks did the same. Their systems allow 
accessing to usual banking services (such as inquiry, account information, money transfers 
and remittances, storing value, payments) through mobile phones. The success of mobile 
banking was also due to the surge in mobile commerce that has been registered since the 
moment in which the government granted 3G mobile network licenses to phone operators. At 
that time, the main issue was to set up systems ensuring network security, reliable electronic 
signatures and so on; hence, the government has been involved in enacting proper rulings 
since 2005. Online payment companies introduced Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI, i.e. digital 
certificates) and One-Time Passwords (OTPs).  
Mobile payment services are based on an active cooperation between financial institutions 
and mobile operators. China has three main mobile payment models: mobile network operator 
centric (focusing on micropayments, i.e. mobile wallets and phone bills); financial institution 
centric (mainly arranging for macro-payments); and third-party operator centric, in which an 
intermediary (the third party) arranges for mobile payment services (both at micro and macro 
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level) by integrating the mobile communications network with the financial institutions’ 
payment accounts. While the first model has succeeded in Japan and the second in Korea, the 
best model for China is the third one:  both financial institutions and mobile operators 
operating in the country enjoy strong bargaining power and are willing to provide different 
kinds of services; by implementing the ‘one connection, multiple services’ concept, mobile 
network operators and banks are encouraged to collaborate. In China, there are two main 
categories of third-party payment providers, i.e. the non-independent ones (those that started 
with e-commerce platforms and later expanded their services) and the independent ones 
(those that were born as such). Among the firms belonging to the first category, the market 
leader is Alipay, with a market share touching the 80% (Lu et al., 2011; To and Lai, 2014). It 
is a third-party online payment platform introduced by Alibaba in 2004 and accounts for half 
of all online payment in China. It provides real time payment solutions and account settlement 
in many currencies. Among its products and services, Cross Border website payment is 
definitely the most relevant since it allows to move money worldwide (StockNewsDesk, 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UnionPay was introduced in 2002 by the People’s Bank of China and was founded by 85 
Chinese banks, included the state-owned ones; it can hence be defined as the government-
supported payment card network. It soon became a leader in the card and payment market: 
every transaction denominated in Yuan must pass through UnionPay's electronic payment 
network. Financial authorities however found out that shops allowed customers owning 
UnionPay cards to make fake purchases in order to circumvent currency exports controls by 
Chinese authorities. This practice obviously violates AML regulations as well as currency 
controls (Pomfret, 2014). In 2012, China UnionPay and China Mobile signed up an agreement 
aiming at sustaining the expansion of mobile payments. According to their contract, users 
could enjoy remote payment services (also called online payment, which includes: credit card 
Source: Lu et al., 2011. 
 
 
87 
 
repayments, utilities payments, online shopping through SIM cards) and mobile contactless 
payments (To and Lai, 2014). 
 
WeChat is a mobile communication service launched by Tencent in China in 2011. Besides 
text and voice messaging services, it allows making payments and transferring money; it has 
hence become a competitor of Alipay. Last year, Tencent started allowing making overseas 
transactions through WeChat Pay. Thanks to the partnership among WeChat and Chinese 
banks, users have just to scan their QR codes and RMB are automatically converted into 
foreign currency (British pound, Hong Kong dollar, U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Canadian 
dollar, Australian dollar, Euro, New Zealand dollar and Korean won) (Liu, 2015). 
During spring 2016, Tencent invested RMB 100 million in the Xinghua Jihua project, whose 
main goal is to speed up the expansion of WeChat Payment (Sun, 2016).  
 
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH 
 
Mobile and online banking experienced a great surge in China thanks to government policies 
discouraging the use of cash and the expansion of e-commerce. Mobile transactions are the 
cheapest way to move money: their cost correspond to the 2% of banking costs, 10% of ATM 
costs and 50% of internet banking costs; new players in the field would be therefore desirable 
(IFAD, 2013). Ken Research (2014) published a report saying that Chinese money transfer 
market will grow at a compounded average growth rate close 
to 7.4% thanks to higher acceptance rate of online transfers. 
The mobile payment market size has significantly expanded 
in the last years; the biggest Chinese players in the mobile 
payment sector are Alipay, Lakala, Union Pay and Tenpay. 
Online money transfers have increased as well thanks to the 
extension of Internet penetration and to the lower charges 
with respect to money transfers through banks’ branches. 
Since the mobile banking market has just taken off, 
companies definitely have many growth opportunities; 
financial institutions, operators, and Third-Party Payment 
providers have been exploiting the market (To and Lai, 
2014). A Deloitte research reports the statistics of the 
Share of global 
Smartphone shipments 
Source: Van Den Dam, 2013. 
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Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China saying that, in March 2012, the 
number of mobile subscribers in China was already over 1 billion, corresponding to “three 
[times] the mobile base in North America and [more] than the entire mobile subscriber in 
Europe”. The main concern is that 3G services have slowly spread, so there might be 
technological gap to fill; however, the government sought to increase the number of 3G users 
through its policies contained in the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development of China (Deloitte Consulting, 2012). 
 
First of all, mobile companies could involve the poorest segment of population living in rural 
areas where banks have never operated or have closed their branches; mobile phones are 
instead more easily accessible and would constitute a great alternative to banks. Since a 
considerable portion of the Chinese population is not educated, another important factor to 
take into account is the ease of use of these services. In addition, mobile operators could 
concentrate in presenting themselves as reliable. I previously mentioned that trust is a greatly 
important factor in the Chinese culture; putting more efforts in increasing their 
trustworthiness would definitely attract more customers. Chinese people feel particularly 
exposed to technology risk (i.e. the risk that users choose unconfident technologies), 
information loss, and attacks (e.g. denial of service and malware) (To and Lai, 2014). China is 
indeed culturally different from Western countries, so both financial institutions and mobile 
operators willing to launch mobile or online payment networks must take into consideration 
its features. New technologies may be largely perceived as unsafe and risky because the 
Chinese are particularly risk-averse and reluctant to changes; in addition, a large part of the 
population lacks computer and mobile phone skills. The collectivist behavior may affect the 
willingness to adopt to technological changes by whole groups of individuals. Hence, before 
introducing new systems, banks and operators should try to increase consumers’ awareness 
and acceptance of new technologies and promote them as secure and reliable (Laforet and Li, 
2005).    
The 12
th
 Five-Year Plan includes instructions to “actively develop e-commerce, improve e-
commerce services for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and promote the building of 
credit service, online payment, logistics and other supporting services for the public” (To and 
Lai, 2014). On the other hand, the Bank of China fears that the booming acceptance of mobile 
payments such as WeChat and Alipay will threaten the conventional banking system by 
taking business away from it. It has therefore started drafting policies setting a threshold on 
the amount of money that can be spent through mobile payment apps (Fin Tech, 2014). 
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Many Cross-border Payment Services have been launched in the last years. Alipay is probably 
the most famous one, but the same services are offered by Tenpay. PayEase provides SMS 
mobile payments, Internet banking, and point-of-sale (POS) terminals by supporting more 
than 60 kinds of credit and debit cards. AsiaPay offers payment services in 12 Asian countries 
(China included) via credit and debit cards issued by Visa, MasterCard, American Express, 
JCB, China UnionPay and others. NTT Com Asia provides e-Commerce and m-commerce 
through its platform for domestic and cross-border transactions in many currencies. Red Dot 
Payment allows payments with Visa, MasterCard and China UnionPay, but also with Alipay, 
Tenpay, and 99Bill. MOLPay offers payments with cards in more than 170 currencies but also 
national online banking for many Asian Pacific Caribbean banks and cash payments in 
different kinds of stores (Jiang, 2016). 
 
In the next chapter, I will briefly analyze the Chinese Anti-Money laundering regulation as 
well as the Italian regulation and remittance market, as well as the specific regulation for 
Money Transfer Companies. I will then report data about the remittances outflows from Italy 
to China, which are huge with respect to those to other countries, and have been decreasing 
after the last investigations by Italian authorities. The detections have indeed revealed that 
money transfers to China are so high because most of money derives from illicit activities, 
especially from fake invoicing and the sale of counterfeited goods. My empirical analysis will 
demonstrate these facts, and the comparison with the Pakistani and the Moroccan community 
in Italy will further confirm the results. 
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CHAPTER 5: MONEY LAUNDERING 
ACTIVITIES BY THE CHINESE: CASE STUDY 
ON REMITTANCES FLOWS FROM ITALY TO 
CHINA 
 
I. MONEY LAUNDERING IN CHINA 
 
For very long time, the Chinese population has preferred to make payments by using cash, 
which accounted for more than 80% of total payments up to 2005 (Tang and Yin, 2005). Cash 
was used even when purchasing cars or houses. However, since the origin of cash is difficult 
to determine, especially in places where underground banks are largely used, the government 
has gradually encouraged non-cash payments. As a result, the country has recently shifted to 
virtual payments made through debit or credit cards, and e-wallet mobile apps are becoming 
particularly popular. Some segments of the population still prefer using cash (i.e. the poor, 
who do not have access to credit cards, and the rich, who want to hide their wealth); anyway, 
a research made by Reuters demonstrated the huge increase in bankcards issuance, which 
exceeded 4.2 billion at the end of 2013. MasterCard has defined this change as “from cash to 
cashless” (Waldmeir and Rabinovitch, 2014). 
Contrarily from the neighboring Hong Kong and Singapore, China is not acknowledged as an 
offshore financial center; nonetheless, the country set up some development zones, many 
Special Economic Zones (e.g. Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen), as well as the Shanghai 
Free Trade Zone (US Department of State, 2015). The development of the financial sector and 
of the technological devices has led the country to become the world leader in illicit capital 
flows, with more than $1 trillion of illicit money outflows from China from 2003 to 2012 
(Gascoigne, 2014). 
Cleaning of dirty money by legal persons established in mainland China is often 
accomplished by exploiting their branches or financial institutions set up in Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) which enjoys specific and privileged conditions; 
physical persons may instead act as if they were remitting money to relatives living elsewhere 
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and get the amount back in the form of gifts or donations (US Department of State, 2015). In 
the years from 2000 to 2011, illicit financial flows from China (excluding the intra-regional 
trade with Hong Kong and Macao) summed to US $3.79 trillion; a substantial part of those 
outflows went back to China in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This is due to 
the advantages coming from FDI regulations, which make it easy to set up complex money 
laundering scheme: usually, much of legitimate money goes out of China in the form of FDI 
to Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands (BVI), but is then laundered into another entity 
and reinvested in China as FDI from Hong Kong or the BVI (Kar and Freitas, 2013). 
Alternatively, launderers address to underground banks illegally operating inside China. 
These agents offer less expensive procedures to transfer dirty money abroad because 
underground bankers usually refer to the lowest price to determine the exchange rate to apply 
(Yang, 2002). Hence, notwithstanding the regulations restricting the amount of Chinese 
currency that can be converted into foreign currency and transferred abroad, many individuals 
use money laundering techniques to elude these limitations (US Department of State, 2015). 
The final outflows commonly support crime, corruption, and tax evasion, and consequently 
take capital away from the real economy (Gascoigne, 2014). The main methods used in order 
to elude Chinese currency controls are money transfers through Hong Kong money changers; 
transferring checks issued by underground bankers across the border to Hong Kong; 
operations through banks (cash transactions, account payments..) with fake ID cards; cash 
smuggling; trade-based money laundering or laundering through the underground banking 
system (FATF, 2007; Lee and Luo, 2015). 
In the last years, Chinese authorities have also observed an increasing trend of criminal 
activities in cash-intensive sectors (real estate, securities, insurance, legal profession) and 
have found out that most of money deriving from these activities are moved abroad (FATF, 
2007). As I explained in the previous chapter, the wealthiest Chinese individuals have 
invested their money in foreign assets since they believed that they could get higher returns. 
Fletcher (2014) reported that more than US $50 billion have been transferred outside China in 
20 years, giving rise to the phenomenon of hot money outflows. Bank of China and China 
Citic Bank were blamed to facilitate money outflows by providing underground banking 
services to their customers and they violated currency control laws.  
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A Reuters analysis has found out that a “growing numbers of Chinese are using the country's 
state-backed bankcards to illegally spirit billions of dollars abroad” through Macau. The 
government-backed payment card system (i.e. China UnionPay) is used to make fake 
purchases allowing people to circumvent the severe currency-export control, i.e. cash-back 
transactions. UnionPay was set up to open up China’s capital account, but it has revealed as a 
major tool for channeling illicit money out of the country by rich Chinese as well as by 
corrupt individuals; therefore, foreign banks belonging to the UnionPay network were 
required to close accounts of merchants involved in illicit transactions (Pomfret, 2014). 
Criminal activities in China mostly involve corruption, narcotics and human trafficking, 
smuggling, economic crimes, intellectual property theft, counterfeit goods, crimes against 
property, tax evasion. Money laundering often involves state-owned firms that clean dirty 
money through various methods, which are the same described in chapter three (cash 
smuggling, false trading, invoice manipulation, purchase of valuable assets, gambling). New 
methods are however wide spreading: among them, illegal fundraising activity, cross-border 
telecommunications fraud, and corruption in the banking, securities and transportation sectors 
are the most common (US Department of State, 2015). 
Evidence shows that criminal activities originate in the most developed areas (especially 
coastal ones) and spread to internal poorer zones (US Department of State, 2015). In 2007, 
more than half of financial crimes took place in coastal areas and those in Guangdong 
corresponded to one third of all detected cases; other places commonly subject to abuse are 
Shandong, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Yunnan and Shanghai. When investigating on money 
laundering cases, the People’s Bank of China (i.e. the Chinese Central Bank) pays particular 
Illicit Financial Outflows from China (Mainland): 2002-2011 
Source: Fletcher, 2014. 
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attention on excess cash, recurrent withdrawals or receipt of high amounts of cash, efforts to 
get foreign exchange, and frequent high value forex remittances (Passas, Hsu and Li, 2012). 
 
II. AML/CFT REGULATION IN CHINA 
 
Since the People’s Republic of China is one of the major player in the worldwide economy, it 
is essential that it takes part in activities aimed at ensuring credible investment and trade 
frameworks and at guaranteeing the effectiveness of international anti-money laundering 
regulations; however it has been historically averse to outside influences (Heilmann and 
Schulte‐Kulkmann, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the picture published in the Asian Banker White Paper (2009), the country 
started implementing a national AML/CFT regime at the end of the 1990s. The first step was 
the introduction in the Criminal Code of specific articles concerning money laundering, 
according to which  “whoever, while clearly knowing that the funds are proceeds illegally 
Development of AML regulatory regime in China 
Source: Asian Banker White Paper, 2009. 
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obtained from drug-related crimes or from crimes committed by organizations in the nature of 
criminal syndicate, crimes of terrorism or crimes of smuggling and gains derived there from, 
commits any of the following acts in order to cover up or conceal the source or nature of the 
funds shall, in addition to being confiscated of the said proceeds and gains, be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than 5 years or criminal detention and shall also, or 
shall only, be fined not less than 5 percent but not more than 20 percent of the amount of 
money laundered” (Criminal Law, 1997).  
In 1998, the FATF put effort in trying to include China in the worldwide anti-money 
laundering framework, but China has been reluctant to join it until the most powerful 
economies started complying with FATF recommendations; since that moment, China 
experienced a radical conversion from a reluctant approach to an active involvement in the 
FATF. Despite its scarce experience in the field, in the last few years China has taken many 
actions aimed at combating money laundering thanks to the job of the National People’s 
Congress of China and the central government (Heilmann and Schulte‐Kulkmann, 2011). 
After 11 September 2001, the National People's Congress of China included terrorism as a 
money laundering-related crime and the country ratified the main international counter-
terrorist treaties (EAG, 2010): these developments were primarily due to the fact that in that 
year the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and started liberalizing its 
financial market. Nonetheless, China did not accurately regulate the tracing of large value 
transactions and money laundering became a huge problem, also due to the fact that 
developing countries are particularly attractive for launderers (Heilmann and 
Schulte‐Kulkmann, 2011). For these reasons, the following year some representatives of the 
National People’s Congress proposed the drafting of anti-money laundering laws and the 
Budget Committee was given this task. Anyway, it was not an easy process because the 
country started introducing AML laws much later than many other jurisdictions and had to 
take into account all the previously enacted international laws. 
Efforts for financial crime prevention were strengthen in 2004, when the country joined the 
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and later 
hosted some of the EAG Plenary meetings. In 2006, the Eurasian Group evaluated China’s 
AML and CFT framework based on the documents provided by Chinese authorities and the 
FATF found out that the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) had already detected 600 violations 
during the previous year: hence, by November 2006, more than 7,000 people were employed 
in AML division of the PBOC (FATF, 2007). One year later, China became a FATF member: 
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the country revised its anti-money laundering regulations and finally adopted the Anti-Money 
Laundering Law initiated by the Budget Committee. It includes more than 70 types of 
individual crimes and consists of seven chapters:  
i) General Provisions;  
ii) AML supervision and administration. These activities are carried out by the 
Administrative Department of Anti-Money Laundering of the State Council. The 
Chinese Financial Intelligence Unit is the AML information center that analyzes 
suspicious and large value transactions reports; the FIU is part of the People’s 
Bank of China and it is therefore considered as the national supervisor (Ping, 
2007). The Financial Intelligence Unit functions were allocated between two units: 
the Anti-Money Laundering Bureau (AMLB), which organizes and initiates 
investigations on Suspicious Transactions, and the China Anti-Money Laundering 
Monitoring and Analysis Center (CAMLMAC) that carries out activities such as 
data collection and analysis through the Bank of China’s branches. It is also the 
point of interaction with foreign Financial Intelligence Units (EAG, 2010). 
iii) AML obligations of financial institutions:  they must establish identification and 
document preservation systems as well as large-value transaction reporting system. 
iv) Banks must report to the FIU any cash deposit or withdrawal exceeding RMB 
200,000 or foreign-currency withdrawals of over $10,000 in a single day, money 
transfers beyond RMB 2 million between companies or between an individual and 
a company above RMB 500,000. Monthly reports about suspicious activities are 
also required (Asian Banker White Paper, 2009).  
v) AML investigation, which is carried out by the Administrative Department of 
Anti-Money Laundering of the State Council; this body can take decisions about 
freezing actions. 
vi) International cooperation with foreign government and international organizations, 
which is based on Article 27. The rule however does not appoint which body 
should take care of judicial assistance nor provides mechanisms for confiscated 
assets sharing. 
vii) Legal liabilities. Financial institutions not complying with AML obligations are 
first suggested to adopt those provisions and then (if they do not comply within a 
certain time period), they are given disciplinary sanctions (Ping, 2007).  
According to Ping (2007), the Law has many advantages: it imposes AML obligations also to 
non-financial institutions; it tries to protect individual and legal persons’ rights; it incorporates 
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FATF Recommendation and imposes the supervision of funds likely to be involved in 
terrorism activities. However, the author outlined some drawbacks as well: the law does not 
regulate criminal suppression (for instance, confiscated asset sharing) and does not 
completely fill some gaps with international provisions. On the contrary. the main pitfall of 
this ruling is that an independent AML administrative department (supervising both financial 
and non-financial institutions) was not appointed; they rather engaged the People’s Bank of 
China as the national body overseeing AML/CFT activities, including the monitoring of 
suspicious transactions and the implementation of international criteria.  
On 23 November 2010, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security said that, since 2002, 500 
underground banks had closed thanks to money laundering deterrence and detection (Xinhua, 
2010). Nowadays, the PCAC (Payment & Clearing Association of China) and other industry 
associations support the People’s Bank of China Anti-Money Laundering Office systems in 
the enactment of anti-money laundering guidelines (Wang and Ou, 2015). 
China still lacks regulation for non-financial businesses and professions. The country has 
some confiscation laws but they are not frequently enforced. The US and China have arranged 
the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters but American authorities 
have been complaining about the scarce cooperation of the Chinese counterparties. The US 
suggested that “China should also cooperate with international law enforcement to investigate 
how indigenous Chinese underground financial systems and trade-based value transfer are 
used to circumvent capital restrictions for illicit outbound transfers and capital flight, and to 
receive inbound remittances and criminal proceeds for Chinese organized crime”  (US 
Department of State, 2015). 
As shown by the table, data referred to 2009 shows the divergence between China and other 
two countries’ (UK and Australia) Anti-Money Laundering regime. Except for Customer Due 
Diligence, China demonstrated to be still very far from reaching the level of other countries’ 
regulation and even lacked laws about a couple of matters.  
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Nowadays, China’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing regulatory framework 
consists of: 
i) Laws: the Criminal Law; Anti-money Laundering Law, Decisions of the National 
People's Congress on Strengthening Antiterrorism Work and Interpretations of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Applicable Laws for Cases of Money Laundering and 
Other Criminal Cases;  
ii) Regulations: Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Financial Institutions; 
Administrative Measures for Financial Institutions on the Reporting of Large-
value or Suspicious Transactions; Administrative Measures for Financial 
Institutions on the Reporting of Transactions Suspicious of Terrorist Financing; 
Administrative Measures for Financial Institutions on Customer Identification and 
Preservation of Records on Customer Identification Information and Transactions; 
Administrative Measures for the Freezing of Assets Suspicious of Terrorist 
Activities; 
iii) Normative and policy documents: Administrative Measures for Payment 
Institutions on Anti-money Laundering and Antiterrorism Financing Issues; 
Measures for Financial Institutions on Anti-money Laundering Supervision and 
Administration (Trial) and other supporting systems (China, Sixth Meeting). 
Assessment of China’s regulatory AML regime 
Source: Asian Banker White Paper, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
As I said above, the main supervisory body is the Anti-Money Laundering Bureau of the 
People’s Bank of China, which collaborates with the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), and China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Security has an AML Division and 
an Anti-Terrorism Bureau, which ensure the law enforcement (Asian Banker White Paper, 
2009). Nevertheless, law compliance still poses some challenges. First of all, the great number 
of underground banks makes it very difficult to set up an effective AML/CFT framework; 
secondly,such mechanisms as suspicious transaction reporting and internal controls are still 
not very effective in many commercial banks, especially those located in rural areas, and 
financial institutions are not required to set up an audit unit examining compliance nor to 
provide employees training about this subject. In addition, there is a general lack of public 
information, and, since China presents significant differences among regions, each area is 
subject to specific money laundering activities and hence requires distinct provisions. Last but 
not least, China is well known for the great number of fake ID documents. This issue is 
exacerbated by the fact that many people in China have the same name and, given that there is 
not a direct correspondence between Chinese and Latin characters, Chinese names can be 
translated in many different ways, therefore making it easier to conceal real identities (Asian 
Banker White Paper, 2009). 
 
III. MONEY TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND 
CHINA THROUGH MONEY TRANSFERS 
 
Starting from 2005, the Bank of Italy carries out controls on cross-border transactions not 
passing through bank current accounts but rather through licensed intermediaries. Data on 
remittances published by Bank of Italy highlighted that, among all the ethnic communities 
living in Italy, the Chinese are those sending the highest amount of money to their country. 
More than 90% of money directed to China are sent from Rome, Prato, Florence and Milan, 
which are the provinces where most of the Chinese population resides (Banca d’Italia). 
The World Bank reported the price of sending remittances from Italy to China in 2013.  
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While China has been for long time on the top of the received remittances ranking, money 
transfers from Italy have drastically shrunk since 2012: in 2011 the total amount was equal to 
€ 2,537 million, but three years later the Chinese transferred “only” € 819 million, although 
the Chinese population in Italy had increased by 22.3%. The reasons behind this fact are still 
not clear, but it is likely that the anti-money laundering investigations by Italian authorities 
have led the Chinese to look for other ways to move money (Zanotti, 2015; Esposito, 2015). 
 
 
Source: data from Banca d’Italia. 
 
IV. OVERVIEW ON THE ITALIAN REMITTANCES 
MARKET 
 
Outflows from Italy are much higher than inflows: the amount of money leaving the country 
through formal channels in the form of remittances has been incredibly increasing from 2005 
to 2011 (+ €3.5 billions), but remittances have been dropping since the following year. The 
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fall seems to be in line with the fact that migrants families are less integrated than before and 
that more migrants are unemployed. The country recording the greatest reduction of 
remittances from Italy is China, while countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Moldova have 
recorded an increase of inflows (Banca d’Italia, a). 
Market structure. The Italian money transfer industry is mostly constituted by EU-operators, 
while Italian ones are just a small portion. At the end of 2012, Italian Payment Institutions 
providing remittance services were nineteen, but just three years later they were nine; on the 
contrary, EU providers are almost 300.  
As for market concentration, three operators own the 75% of the total market share (Camera 
Dei Deputati, 2016); the dominant players are Western Union and MoneyGram, but Ria 
Finacial and Coinstar are also common. In addition, there are some MTOs serving merely 
some corridors (e.g. remittances to Senegal are provided by Money Express and Choice 
Money; those to Rumenia by Smith & Smith, to India by ICICI Bank and Remit2India; to 
China by Money2money) (Giangaspero, 2009). 
The Italian remittance market is continuously expanding: in 2009, 6,500 branches were open 
and the entrance of some online providers into the market (e.g. Skrill, World Remit, 
Transferwise, Xendpay) have led the “historical” operators to introduce cash-to-bank accounts 
and online transfer services. Poste Italiane signed an agreement with Money Gram; some 
banks tried to expand the migrant banking market (e.g. Mutual banks, Banca Popolare di 
Sondrio, Banca Popolare di Bergamo, Banca Sella); Western Union launched the so-called 
Direct to bank service and it has recently entered into partnerships with Intesa San Paolo and 
Unicredit. The former agreement allowed introducing remittance services via ATMs or 
internet banking, while the contract with Unicredit resulted in the setting up of the service 
Unicredit - AgenziaTu allowing customers to remit money from AgenziaTu branches via 
Western Union (Giangaspero, 2009 and 2014).  
Costs. In 2014, Poste Italiane was the cheapest provider of remittances services. Remittances 
costs have been falling over time and the introduction of online services may contribute to 
further reductions of costs both for providers and for customers. On average, transfers to Asia 
are the most expensive, while those to Latin America are the cheapest. Cost analysis made in 
2014 demonstrated that account-to-account and cash-to-account money transfers through 
banks are the cheapest tools for remitting money, while cards are the most expensive; online 
and mobile payments are not as expensive as cards, but still more costly than bank accounts. 
African corridor has recorded a significant cost reduction, except for Nigeria that, on the 
contrary, has become more costly (Frigeri, 2014). 
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Amount of remittances. Data on remittances published by the Bank of Italy show a constant 
increase of money outflows up to 2011; since then, remittances have started decreasing 
(Banca d’Italia, a), probably because of the effects of the economic crisis on migrants’ 
income. However, except for China and a few other countries (Brasil, Philippines, Ecuador), 
the decline of money transfers was limited to 2012: we can hence confirm the counter-cyclical 
characteristic of remittances (Frigeri, 2014). In fact, the drop of remittances outflows in the 
last few years has been mainly due to a meaningful decrease of money transfers to China; 
since authorities were afraid that the decrease was due to the use of other (even more risky) 
channels to move money, they initiated some investigations which finally revealed that 
migrants addressed to EU-Payment Institutions that did not attentively record transactions and 
did not communicate their data about remittances (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016).  
On 16 February 2016, the Bank of Italy published a new ruling (Provvedimento recante 
disposizioni in materia di raccolta di informazioni statistiche per la bilancia dei pagamenti e 
la posizione patrimoniale verso l'estero) according to which, from 1 March 2016 on, banks, 
Poste Italiane, Italian Electronic Money and Payment Institutions are no more subject to 
communication requirements about remittance services; EU-MTOs may instead communicate 
data on a voluntary basis (Banca d’Italia, 2016). This provision may however distort the 
assessment of remittances’ impact on the country’s economy; in fact, as I explained in the 
first chapter, remittances flows are recorded in the Balance of Payments of the country and 
Average cost per product (October 2014)- computed on € 150 
Average cost for different providers (October 2014)- computed on € 
150 
Source: elaboration by Frigeri, 2014 -  based on data from www.mandasoldiacasa.it 
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are fundamental to compute the real trade balance and the sustainable deficit. In the next 
years, the lack of information about remittances outflows and inflows may lead to distorted 
computations of the Balance of Payment. 
Money Transfer Operators regulation. Money transfer agents’ must be listed in the official 
list of financial activities agents because they are very vulnerable to abuses (Fondazione Icsa, 
2012). According to d.lgs. 385/1993 (TUB), remittance services can be provided by Payment 
Institutions and Electronic Money Institutions authorized by the Bank of Italy; they must 
comply with rules on minimum capital, professional requirements for corporate executives as 
well as requirements about corporate organization and internal controls. Bank of Italy has 
supervisory, investigation and disciplinary powers (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016).  
 
V. CASE STUDY 
 
A. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION IN ITALY 
 
Italy enjoys a strategic location that facilitates the passing through of criminal proceeds from 
and to the whole Mediterranean area. Italy’s biggest organized crime groups are Camorra, 
‘Ndrangheta, and Mafia and they constitute the main source of money laundering proceeds, 
which are estimated to account for 12.4% of the country’s GDP. These groups largely engage 
in drug trafficking, tax evasion, smuggling and sale of counterfeit goods, extortion, 
corruption, and usury, but they also contribute to terrorism through document counterfeiting. 
They address to either formal or informal banking sector, but also to the offshore ones (US 
Department of State, 2015). In its 2014 Annual Report, the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit 
listed the three main types of behaviors which it normally faces whenever it investigates on 
suspicious transaction reports. Behaviors associated to corruption constitute a well-known 
phenomenon in Italy and are related to the embezzlement of public funds; the appropriative 
category instead includes transactions related to the illicit embezzlement of resources through 
telematics fraud, usury and buy-gold shops. Finally, the fiscal typology of money laundering 
includes transactions linked to fiscal evasion or fraud, which may be sometimes aimed at 
introducing dirty money in the real economy (e.g. through over invoicing practices). These 
money laundering practices are widely used in Italy and suspicious transactions are usually 
related to fake invoices, funds transfers between physical and legal persons related to each 
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other, and the use of personal current account to bring about commercial transactions (Banca 
d’Italia, 2015). Furthermore, data collected from the Finance Committee demonstrated that 
cash is used in the 91% of transactions in Italy. The great use of banknotes is quite risky 
because it allows hiding the purchase of goods or services and circumventing disclosure 
requirements; moreover it allows introducing in the economic system money deriving from 
illicit activities (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). 
European Legislation. Italy is subject to European Regulations and Directives on the topic. 
The Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
of 1990 aimed at “facilitat[ing] international co-operation and mutual assistance in 
investigating crime and tracking down, seizing and confiscating the proceeds thereof [and 
hence] intended to assist States in attaining a similar degree of efficiency even in the absence 
of full legislative harmony.” (European Council, 1990). The Directive 91 /308/EEC states that 
“launderers could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movement and freedom to 
supply financial services which the integrated financial area involves, if certain coordinating 
measures are not adopted at Community level”; the European Commission hence established 
that :states must consider money laundering as a crime; any financial institution must identify 
customers making transactions equal to or above €15,000;transactions records must be kept 
for at least five years; in case of suspicious transactions, financial institutions must  refuse to 
transfer money and, if the transactions have been made, authorities must collaborate and 
hence restrict banking secrecy in order to facilitate cooperation.  
After the terrorist attacks in New York, the Directive 2001/97/EC included terrorism 
financing as a possible destination of illicit money deriving from money laundering activities 
and other categories of intermediaries were subject to regulations. The Directive 91/308/EEC 
was finally abolished in 2005, when it was replaced by the Directive 2005/60/EC on 
preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing. As 
said by its name, the directive aims at conforming to FATF standards and hence at preventing 
the use of the financial and non-financial sectors by launderers and terrorist financers. By 
including also the non-financial sector, it addresses to lawyers, notaries, accountants, estate 
agents, providers of gambling services, trust and company service providers, and to all 
providers of goods accepting cash payments above €15,000. All these agents are required to 
verify the identity of both originator and beneficial owner, to report suspicious transactions 
and to train employees in order to make them aware of the standards they have to respect; 
enhanced due diligence must be applied in cases of higher money laundering and terrorism 
financing risk (EUR-Lex, 2016). Directive 2005/60/EC and the following 2006/70/EC were 
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substituted by Directive 2015/849, which requires applying Customer Due Diligence also to 
electronic money transactions; simplified CDD can be applied whenever an area of low risk is 
identified, while enhanced CDD must be applied with high risk countries.  
The Payment Services Directive recognized new payment institutions to provide banking 
services, such as money remitters, retailers, and phone companies; depending on the license 
they apply for, some PSPs were also allowed to provide remittance services.  The Directive 
hence provided a new regulatory framework which permitted non-bank bodies (including gas-
stations and supermarkets) to act as money transfer agents. PSD provisions are in line with 
FATF recommendations as it recognizes the importance “to ensure that all persons providing 
remittance services are brought within the ambit of certain minimum legal and regulatory 
requirements. Thus, it is desirable to require the registration of the identity and whereabouts 
of all persons providing remittance services, including of persons which are unable to meet 
the full range of conditions for authorization as payment institutions. (..)For those purposes, 
Member States should enter such persons in the register of payment institutions while not 
applying all or part of the conditions for authorization. However, it is essential to make the 
possibility of waiver subject to strict requirements relating to the volume of payment 
transactions.” (Directive 2007/64/EC). 
Italian Legislation. Money laundering was first introduced in the Italian Criminal Code with 
the Law No. 191 of 18 May 1978. However, it was just in 1991 that the banking system was 
actually involved in the prevention of money laundering with the Law No. 197, establishing 
urgent provisions to limit the use of cash and bearer securities and to prevent the use of the 
financial system for money laundering purposes. Transactions involving cash and bearer 
securities exceeding £20,000,000 were required to be executed only through specific financial 
intermediaries listed in the legislative decree and then recorded and kept in an electronic 
archive for at least ten years; moreover suspicious transactions had to be signaled (Dlgs. 5 
luglio 1991, n. 197).  
In 2013, the government issued new rules aiming to boost transparency of companies and to 
identify non-UE jurisdictions and it required entities to terminate business relationship with 
people or companies which cannot be completely identified. The following year, the Bank of 
Italy issued enhanced Customer Due Diligence provisions for Politically Exposed Persons and 
introduced the Electronic Data Base, on which financial intermediaries must register all 
significant transactions (US Department of State, 2015). 
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As for regulation on the use of cash, the threshold for cash payments was enhanced from € 
999.99 to € 2,999.99 last January; traceable instruments of payment must be therefore used to 
move cash exceeding €3,000. The new threshold can be applied also to some currency 
exchange transactions made by exchange houses, which were previously allowed to handle 
cash transactions up to €2,499.99; on the contrary, since the Guardia di Finanza has found out 
some links between migration flows and financial transactions from and to Italy, money 
transfer businesses are still subject to the €999.99 and are therefore excluded from the new 
rules contained in the 2016 Legge di Stabilità (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016).  
The regulatory framework about money laundering and money transfer includes:  
 D.Lgs. 25 September 1999, n. 374: extension of provisions on laundering of capital 
with illicit sources and financial activities particularly susceptible to money 
laundering; 
 D.M. 13 dicember 2001, n. 485: agency in financial activity; 
 Law No. 155, 31 July 2005: urgent measures for contrasting international terrorism; 
 D.Lgs. 21 november 2007, n. 231: implementation of directive 2005/60/CE and 
2006/70/CE (see above); 
 Law 15 July 2009, n. 94: Dispositions on public security concerning new obligations 
for money transfers, if the originator is an extra-Community citizen (Palana, 2010). 
Competent authorities. Article No. 2 of Regulation 1889/2005 set out that the competent 
authorities in the anti-money laundering field are: Agenzia delle Dogane, which controls the 
declarations of individuals carrying more than €10,000; Guardia di Finanza; the Ministry of 
Economics and Finance, which take decisions about disciplinary sanctions; the Financial 
Information Unit (FIU) of Bank of Italy, which collects information on money laundering and 
terrorism financing at the border (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). 
 
Although the regulatory framework is quite complete, Italian authorities has recently found 
more than 400 abusive money transfer agents and they estimated that the 30% of the money 
transfer providers operating in Italy is illegal (Palana, 2010). Investigations on these operators 
have been therefore intensified. The first national Analysis on money laundering and 
terrorism financing risks was carried out in 2014; the Financial Security Committee reported 
that the money transfer activities are strictly related to the high number of immigrants 
remitting money to their families. The remittance service providers in Italy are subject to ML 
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and TF risk because they handle large amount of cash (which is often divided into low-value 
tranches to circumvent controls and then sent to countries with weak AML/CFT regulation), 
and they operate out of the regulated financial sector (most of them operate in bars, internet 
point centers, currency exchange offices etc); proofs of money laundering activities through 
money transfers are those of the Chinese community in Italy (e.g. Money2Money and Bank of 
China case) (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016). 
Suspicious Transaction Reporting by MTOs in Italy. Except for some case, MTOs have 
been actively collaborating with authorities; just to have an idea, last year they reported 
210,000 suspicious transactions executed by 30,000 individuals. STRs commonly make 
authorities aware of frequent transactions of amounting to the threshold allowed by the law 
and often executed by “risky” individuals. In the last two years, about the 10% of transactions 
deemed to be linked to terrorists have been concluded through MTOs; moreover, authorities 
found out that many people used to provide fake fiscal codes. Then, in order to ensure a better 
and prompter action, a specialized committee devoted to the examination of suspicious 
transactions was set up last year (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016).In fact, notifications made by 
money transfer agents generally present the same characteristics: the agents do not usually 
know their customers (the relationships between the agents and the customers are normally 
occasional rather than regular) and they are therefore able to provide information just about 
the frequency of transactions made or received by the same individuals and the amount of 
transactions (in particular, if they are lower or just equal to the cash transaction threshold). 
Hence, since this few information should be analyzed on an aggregate basis to understand 
whether transactions are related to illicit activities, the Italian Financial Unit Intelligence is 
developing new methods for investigating suspicious transactions carried out through money 
transfers (Banca d’Italia, 2015). 
AML regulation for MTOs. Individuals transferring money abroad through money transfer 
agents (but also through banks and other financial entities) must pay stamp duties 
corresponding to the 2% of the sum, except for money sent towards EU countries and for 
individuals having INPS number and fiscal code (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). Law No. 94 of 15 
July 2009 introduced the obligation for money transfer agents to ask for residence permit to 
customers willing to move money; that provision may have incentivized the use of informal 
channels by the irregular migrants. Recently, Italy has been discussing about the 
implementation of the fourth European Directive on anti-money laundering (directive EU 
2015/849): new rules introduced communication obligations that will help authorities to get 
clearer and more detailed information in order to ensure prompt and effective actions; 
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furthermore, they extended regulation on online payments and reinforced the cooperation 
among European authorities (Camera Dei Deputati, 2016). European Financial Intelligence 
Units have been given the power of acquiring information by any obligated subject (none of 
them can refuse to provide information) and any FIU can ask for the suspension of the 
accomplishment of suspicious transactions (Banca d’Italia, 2016).  
 
B. THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN ITALY 
 
1. CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS IN ITALY 
 
Chinese firms are typically family businesses in which both the husband and the wife bring in 
their economic resources and strictly respect the hierarchy. Any Chinese who is able to get the 
status of laoban (i.e. boss) has a reason of pride for him and his family thanks to his 
prestigious role (Campani, Carchedi and Tassinari, 1994; FIERI, 2011). 
Caritas Migrantes (2011) reported that Chinese entrepreneurs, together with Moroccan, 
Romanian and Albanian, constituted the 56.9% of the total foreigner entrepreneurs in Italy. 
Researches made by Mestre CGIA in 2010 recorded an increase of Chinese entrepreneurs in 
Italy by 131.1% from 2002 to 2009, and the percentage continued raising notwithstanding the 
economic crisis made revenues decrease. Their businesses are concentrated in Lombardia, 
Veneto and Tuscany; as for the latter, FIERI (2011) said that the 11.5% of firms run by 
Chinese is located in Prato province. The organization also found out that Chinese firms are 
characterized by a higher female and youth participation with respect to other foreigners’ 
firms. The table below demonstrates that the Chinese enterprises are concentrated in some 
industries and constitute a very high portion of the total firms owned by foreigners. 
 
 
 MANUFACTURING 
ACTIVITIES 
COMMERCE ACCOMODATION 
AND RESTAURANTS 
OTHER SERVICES 
ACTIVITIES 
1° China              16,374 Morocco    46,052 China             5,342 China            2,761 
2° Morocco     1,533 China        19,160 Egypt             2,393 Switzerland  1,635 
3° Switzerland    1,398 Senegal      15,342 Switzerland    1,212 Albania           498 
Source: data from Info Camere (2014). 
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In Milan, Chinese mainly set up accommodation activities, especially restaurants (Rapporto 
Camera di CommercioPadova, 2012), while Chinese manufacturing firms prevail in Tuscany 
(mainly textile, clothing and leather); these companies have subcontracting agreements with 
Italian firms for whom they produce components (Sacchetti, 2007). Footwear Chinese firms 
have been expanding in Riviera del Brenta and in Fermo (Marche) but Chinese enterprises 
have been spreading also in Southern Italy, especially in Rome and Naples (Ceccagno, 2004). 
Chinese entrepreneurs are very tied to their homeland and they typically import products from 
China. The biggest Italian cities count many Chinese wholesalers who collect shoes, clothing, 
toys and other merchandise from China in order to gain from labor cost differentials. Some 
wholesalers are themselves the owners of production units in China; some others address to 
third firms in China that are specialized in the production of goods for Italy (Ceccagno, 2004). 
The high amount of imports from China to Italy is due to the low customs controls which 
have made Chinese wholesalers enjoy lower costs for long time; Naples custom is particularly 
easy to access and has allowed under-invoicing practices for many years. 
 
2. MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES BY 
CHINESE IN ITALY 
 
Concerns over illegal transfers of money by the Chinese living in Italy arose in 2007, when an 
anti-money laundering detection took place in a money transfer counter called Sweet Point, 
managed by Chinese (Petrella, 2013). The Guardia di Finanza investigations found out that 
money transfers to China are often used to move money having illicit origins and hence 
constituting the gains from the sale of illicit merchandise in the Italian market. More than four 
hundreds companies controlled by Chinese individuals were involved in money laundering 
transactions through money transfers (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). 
Since the inspection ascertained the transmission of dirty money to China, more examinations 
were initiated. Money transfer bodies, travel agencies and other kinds of shops were 
attentively scrutinized and the authorities finally found out that, from October 2006 to June 
2010, more than 4.5 billion euros were illegally transferred from Italy to China. The money 
transfer house Money2Money was managed by a Chinese and an Italian families (the Cai and 
the Bolzonaro), who played an active role in helping Chinese entrepreneurs or criminals to 
send laundered money to China without risking detections by the authorities (Petrella, 2013). 
 
 
109 
 
Money2Money had provided money transfer services for many years, but it was still small if 
compared to such competitors as Western Union and Money Gram. The huge increase of its 
business in 2006 derived from the agreement between the two families mentioned before, 
according to which the Cai initially acquired the 10% of the business; the Bolzonaro would 
have later dispose their stake in favor of the Cai in case the Chinese managed to achieve 
remittances flows equal to ten millions euros. Since the maximum threshold for money export 
is €1,999.99, the Chinese divided the amounts into tranches equal to that amount to evade 
examinations (smurfing). Moreover, since the Cai had previously founded the Tian Tian 
business (a mobile company providing SIM cards which allowed calling from Italy to China 
at very low costs), they transferred money by using the ID documents of the Tian Tian users, 
who were obviously unaware that somebody else was using their data to move illicit money 
(Talia, 2015). The Guardia di Finanza found out that some individuals sent money several 
times during the same day but providing different addresses and different Chinese bank 
account numbers for the same receiver or the same bank account number for different 
receivers (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). Data show that those money transfers were mainly made 
by employees (56% of times), self-employed professionals (32%), entrepreneurs (7%) and 
unemployed (4%). The entrepreneurs addressing to Money2Money declared almost no 
income to Italian fiscal authorities but were gaining profits through the sale of counterfeit 
goods, the exploitation of illegal labor and prostitution. Most receivers of those flows were 
Chinese export companies that supplied raw-materials to Chinese firms established in Italy, 
which could therefore avoid paying VAT. Bank of China participated in the illegal money 
transfer activities as well, by allowing depositing that money in their accounts before making 
it available to receivers’ bank accounts in China. About half of the over 4 billion euros moved 
passed through Bank of China; none of the employees reported suspicious transactions to 
competent authorities because the bank gained €750,000 from this illegal business (Talia, 
2015). 
Most of the money was moved from Tuscany, and in particular from Prato, where Chinese 
firms account for more than 10% of the added-value of the whole area. Therefore, Prato is the 
province that originates a large portion of remittances: in only 7 years (2005-2012), money 
sent to China from Prato has recorded an increase of 930%, corresponding to about half 
million of euros per day. These capital flights are detrimental to the local economy, which 
loses money rather than benefitting from partnership with Chinese firms (Rete Sviluppo, 
2014).  
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C. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The following tables summarize data about the official Chinese population resident in Italy on 
the 1 January 2013.  Although there are many Chinese in Italy who are not regular migrants, it 
is likely that irregular immigrants do not address to formal channels for remitting money and 
are not thus included in Bank of Italy’s statistics on remittances outflows; however, they are 
not even included in statistics about official population, so I will not take them into 
consideration for the empirical study. 
 
Total number of Chinese in Italy 
(1/01/2013) 304,768 
women 48.9% 
men 51.1% 
population over 15 yearsold 110,610 
 
workers (per sector) newcontracts endedcontracts 
agriculture 3.1% 3.3% 
industry 46.1% 47.9% 
tertiary 50.8% 48.8% 
 
Source: data from Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, 2014. 
 
Below is the table reporting the amount remittances from Italy to China for the years 
2008/2014. As I am analyzing data about the Chinese population on 1 January 2013, I will 
base my computations on remittances outflows recorded in 2012. 
Remittances per year (thousands of euros) 
2008 1,541,050 
2009 1,970,780 
2010 1,816,330 
2011 2,537,080 
2012 2,674,457 
2013 1,097,859 
2014 819,129 
 
 
Source: Banca d’Italia. 
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Total remittances in 2012 amounted to € 2,674,457 thousands. Officially, on 1 January 2013 
there were 304,768 individuals from China living in Italy; therefore, by dividing the amount 
of remittances by the total Chinese population, I get that each Chinese individual sent € 
8,686.79 to China in 2012. However, I will assume that people under 15 years old migrated 
with their families and therefore do not remit money home; in addition, I will assume that 
they go to school rather than to work (and hence are not taken into consideration when 
computing the average income for Chinese). I will also assume that only Chinese workers are 
able to remit money because the unemployed do not get any wage: since the employment rate 
for the Chinese is about 69.9%, I can divide the total amount of remittances by the 213,034 
working individuals; the outcome suggests that the average remittance per head in 2012 was € 
12,554.12.  
Total average wage € 959 
female average wage € 904 
male average wage € 1,005 
employed 69.9% (42% women) 
looking for a job 2.9% 
inactive 27.2% 
unemployment rate 4% 
 
 
The data reported in the table above inform that, in 2012, the Chinese working in our country 
earned € 959 per month on average; as usually, the average for men was higher than that for 
women (€ 1,005 and € 904 respectively). I can hence easily figure out that the average annual 
wage for the Chinese employed in Italy was about € 11,508. With the available numbers, it is 
possible to determine the portion of wage that was moved to China in 2012: by subtracting the 
amount of remittances per head from the annual wage, I get a negative result, meaning that 
each Chinese transferred to China € 1,046.12 more than the amount earned. Moreover, since 
the data about remittances are computed only on transfers accomplished through formal 
channels, I can reasonably assume that the amount of money transfers is much higher than 
reported by statistics.  
So, how is it possible for the Chinese to transfer such a high amount of money?  
Adoc (2012) estimated the impact of daily expenses on a family living in Italy, composed by 
two adults who have one child and are both employees. The association computed an average 
monthly income per employee equal to € 1,410 (hence € 2,820 per family) and found that 
Source: data from Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, 2014. 
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each family spends about € 39.4 per day: it therefore realized that the life cost accounted for 
the 83.8% of an individual’s earning. As it is likely that the Chinese have different 
preferences and their expenses may not exactly correspond to those of an Italian family, I 
looked at a research about expenses weights for an average Chinese individual: 
 Tobacco, liquor, other 3% 
 Food 32% 
 Residence 17% 
 Recreation/education/culture 14% 
 Transportation/communication 10% 
 Healthcare 10% 
 Clothing 8% 
 Household facilities/articles/services 6% 
Confcommercio (2013) instead estimated weights for a medium Italian individual: 
 Food 22.9% 
 Residence: 30.2% 
 Recreation: 7.8% (+2.8% for holidays) 
 Transportation/communication 16.6% 
 Healthcare 12.7% 
 Clothing 7% 
It seems like the preferences do not differ much: I may therefore assume that the Chinese 
living in Italy spend as much as the Italians to face daily expenses; anyway, whatever the 
consumption pattern of the Chinese is, it is clear that it is not possible for the Chinese to 
transfer money beyond their means. Then, I will try to investigate what is behind these huge 
money transfers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Istat, elaborated by Santonico (2016). 
Import from China (mln of euros) 
2008 23,607 
2009 19,334 
2010 28,789 
2011 29,574 
2012 25,006 
2013 23,071 
2014 25,075 
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First of all, by looking at data about the Chinese population in Italy, I noticed that males and 
females are almost equally present: this may be a clear signal that men use to move to Italy 
with their wives and therefore they do not generally need to send money to their families. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that Chinese firms are mostly family businesses (see the 
paragraph “Chinese entrepreneurs in Italy”) and by interviews to Chinese who revealed that 
most of them do not send money home because their whole family moved to Italy 
(Fondazione Icsa, 2012). So, what is the final destination of remittances? Investigations on 
suspicious transactions revealed that some Italian but prevalently Chinese entrepreneurs 
(especially those operating in the textile sector who make cash payments to Chinese firms in 
China) were the originators of most money transfer transactions. Some studies in fact 
demonstrate that remittances of Chinese are frequently devoted to pay Chinese suppliers: 
estimations say that, in 2007, the 40% of total remittances was devoted to imports rather than 
to family supporting (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). Indeed, Italian imports from China are much 
higher than exports to China: textile, clothing and products for manufacturing firms are the 
main categories of imports (InfoMercatiEsteri), which I found to exactly correspond to the 
main industries operating in areas recording the greatest amount of remittances outflows: this 
may therefore be another sign confirming the fact that remittances are devoted to import 
payments.  
By comparing the amount of imports from China with the revenues of a few sectors in which 
most of Chinese firms in Italy operate, I found a link between the two: this may be interpreted 
as a confirmation that a good trend in those industries was associated to higher production and 
hence, generally, to more imports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Istat, 2014. 
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After this assessment, I also compared imports from China with the amount of remittances 
from 2008 to 2014 but I did not found any link between them, meaning that just in those years 
in which the economic cycle was favorable for the analyzed sectors, the Chinese remitted less 
money to their origin country. If I assume that the increase in imports is a signal of a good 
economic trend (which is in fact confirmed by increasing revenues), I may in turn assume that 
in those years Chinese entrepreneurs resident in Italy paid part of those imports by remitting 
money through informal channels; on the contrary, in the years in which revenues were lower 
and imports decreased as well, the Chinese devoted more time to illicit activities in order to 
get extra money, which they finally remitted and hence generated an increase in money 
outflows. They may also have concealed part of their imports to avoid paying taxes on them, 
which would have exacerbated the decrease in revenues due to the crisis.  
 
 
 
Consequently, I may reasonably conclude that it is likely that some Chinese have been 
involved in under and over-invoicing practices in order to import merchandise and raw 
materials from China while circumventing the payment of taxes and duties. Likewise, these 
practices have definitely allowed many Chinese entrepreneurs to declare lower profits.  
In order to confirm these results, I will now compare remittances to China with those to 
Pakistan and to Morocco, whose communities are both numerous in Italy; similarly to the 
Chinese case, immigrants from Pakistan and Morocco have set up many enterprises in Italy 
but these two countries export much less to Italy with respect to China. 
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1. PAKISTANI COMMUNITY IN ITALY 
 
Pakistani people started coming to Europe with the beginning of the Gulf war in the 90s. 
Migrants are mainly young men, who try to get a job before their families move as well. On 1 
January 2014, the Pakistani living in Italy were more than 100 thousands and constituted the 
13
th
 most numerous foreign community in the country. The 76% of them lives in Northern 
Italy, mostly in Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche 
Sociali, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, 2014b. 
The largest share of Pakistani entrepreneurs work in the manufacturing, accommodation and 
commerce industry. As reported by Infocamere (2014), they are among the foreign 
communities owning the highest number of firms: in 2014, they covered the tenth position for 
the manufacturing sector (397 firms) and the sixth position both for the commerce and the 
accommodation and restoration sectors (respectively 5,653 and 633 firms).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banca d’Italia. 
Total number of Pakistani in Italy (1/01/2014)  106,485 
women 32% 
men 68% 
population under 18 years old 31,523 
of which students 18,128 
population under 30 years old 52% 
of which do not go to school nor to work 7,521 
    
unemployment rate 20,1% 
employement rate 43,30% 
of which employees 33,904 
of which self-employed 9,523 
Remittances per year (thousands of euros) 
2008 63,980 
2009 75,610 
2010 82,210 
2011 94,260 
2012 81,322 
2013 105,992 
2014 125,495 
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Total remittances in 2013 amounted to € 105,992 thousands; by dividing them by the official 
Pakistani population in Italy, I get that each individual sent € 995.37 to Pakistan in 2013. 
Since the available data say that the 43.3% of Pakistani individuals living in Italy was 
employed in 2013, it means that about 46,108 people were able to remit money home. 
Therefore, I can say that, in 2013, the average remittance to Pakistan was about € 2,298.78 per 
head. The paper published by Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2014) reports 
that the Pakistani earnings are higher than those of extra-communitarian individuals working 
in Italy: the 60% earns more than €1,000 per month, and the 34,3% of them earns up to 
€1,250. Since there is no more specific information, I will assume that the 40% earns € 900 
per month, the 34.3% earns € 1,125 and that the 25.7% earns  € 1,300; with these 
assumptions, I get that the average wage for Pakistani was € 12,959.70 in 2013. By 
subtracting the amount of remittances per head in 2013 from the annual wage earned during 
the same year, I get that, on average, Pakistani remitters remained with € 10,660.92.  
Conversely from the China’s case, I got a positive result, meaning that Pakistani did not 
remitted more money than what they disposed: this is a clear signal that these individuals are 
much less likely to conduct illicit activities from which they earn extra money; in addition, 
there are some other differences between the Chinese and the Pakistani case: 
 The table above shows that men immigrants are much more than women, meaning that 
Pakistani men are used to move abroad and leave the family in their native country. 
This fact leads to think that remittances to Pakistan are likely to be devoted to family 
supporting.  
 Imports from Pakistan are very low: in 2013 the total amount of import corresponded 
to € 476.64 million, in 2014 to € 557.25 million and in 2015 to € 578.37 million 
(InfoMercatiEsteri). Devoting money transfers to import payments is probably not 
frequent and would anyway have a lower impact. 
Furthermore, I took data on the Pakistani and Chinese population regularly residing in Italy 
from 2008 to 2014 and I compared them with the remittance outflows to those countries 
during the same years. The two graphs below demonstrate that remittances to Pakistan 
followed the population trend (whenever immigrants from Pakistan increased, remittances to 
their origin country increased as well), while remittances to China moved opposite to 
migration flows, except for 2011.  
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In order to get a uniform comparison between the two cases, I computed the ratio of 
remittances over regular population for the two countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data on population by Comuni-Italiani.it, computed on 31 December. 
 
The table clarifies the huge differences between the remittance flows to Pakistan and to 
China: while for the former country the ratio of remittances over population has been quite 
steady over time, the ratio for China has not been stable at all. Moreover, I also computed the 
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correlation ratio between remittances and population of the two countries for the time period 
considered: China’s data present a negative correlation (-0,535), while Pakistan’s data have a 
positive relationship (0,901). 
By referring to those outcomes, I can make the following considerations: 
 As I said above, Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2014) reported that, on 
average, Pakistani employees earn more than extra EU individuals in Italy; by 
comparing the data about the Chinese and the Pakistani’s incomes, I found that 
Pakistani’s wages are generally higher than those of the Chinese. Although the 
unemployment rate for the Pakistan is much higher than for the Chinese, how is it 
possible to that the Chinese can afford such a high amount of remittances with respect 
to the Pakistani?  
 The graphs above displaying the economic cycle for some industries show that the 
economic crisis hit harder in 2009 and 2012,which are exactly the two years in which 
the ratios between the remittances to China and the resident Chinese population in 
Italy are highest and also higher than the preceding years (i.e. 2008 and 2011). 
Conversely, the ratio for Pakistani was the same in 2008 and 2009, and in 2012 it was 
lower than the preceding year.  
Before making final considerations, I will add the Morocco case. 
 
2. MOROCCAN COMMUNITY IN ITALY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2014b. 
Total number of Moroccans in Italy (1/01/2014)  454,773 
women 44% 
men 56% 
population under 18 years old 158,764 
of which students 101,167 
population under 30 years old 46.7% 
of which do not go to school nor to work 28,553 
    
unemployment rate 27% 
employement rate 44.1% 
of which employees   
of which self-employed 61,180 
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In 2013, most migrants from Morocco were concentrated in Lombardia, followed by Emilia 
Romagna, Piemonte and Veneto. At the end of that year, the Moroccans where at the top of 
the ranking on the foreign communities with the highest number of individual enterprises. 
Many Moroccans set up enterprises in Lombardia (13.7%) and Piemonte (11.8%); Campania 
also counts many Moroccans firms (9.7%), although a very small portion of the Moroccan 
migrants live there (3.5%). Most enterprises are included in the following industries: 
wholesale and retail commerce; construction; rental, travel and enterprise support; 
manufacturing (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2014 b). 
 
 
   Source: Istat, 2014. 
 
The above graphs show the trend of the three sectors in which most Moroccans are employed 
or self-employed; all of them were hardly hit by the crisis and, by looking at data on 
remittances from Italy to Morocco, I noticed that changes of the amount of money transfers 
correspond to changes in the economic cycle. Although the amount of remittances has not 
changed much over time, it has decreased in the last years. 
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Source: data on remittances from Banca d’Italia, elaborated by Papavero (2015). 
 
Total remittances in 2013 amounted to € 204,940 thousands; by dividing them by the official 
Moroccan population in Italy, I get that each individual sent € 529.80 to Morocco in 2013. 
Since the available data say that the 44.1% of Moroccan individuals living in Italy was 
employed in 2013, it means that about 200,555 people were able to remit money home. 
Therefore, I can say that, in 2013, the average remittance to Morocco was about € 1,021.86 
per head. The paper published by Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2014b) 
reports that, as well as the Pakistani, Moroccan earnings are higher than those of extra-
communitarian individuals working in Italy. More than half of them earns more than € 1,000 
per month and, since there is no more specific information, I will assume that the average 
income per month is just € 1,000. By subtracting the amount of remittances per head in 2013 
from the annual wage earned during the same year, I get that, on average, Moroccan remitters 
remained with € 10,978.14. Likewise the Pakistani and conversely from the Chinese, the 
Moroccan did not remitted more money than what they disposed. Moreover: 
 The table above shows that men immigrants are more than women but the percentages 
do not differ much; this may mean that most Moroccan use to move abroad with their 
families but someone migrates alone; 
 Imports from Morocco are quite low with respect to those from China: in 2013 the 
total amount of import corresponded to € 656.86 million, in 2014 to € 705 million and 
in 2015 to € 797 million (InfoMercatiEsteri; SACE).  
By computing the ratios between the Moroccan population regularly residing in Italy and the 
remittance outflows to Morocco from 2008 to 2014, I noticed that after the beginning of the 
economic crisis, remittances have been decreasing and, conversely from China, lowered both 
in 2009 and 2012, when the crisis hit hard. 
Remittances per year (thousands of euros) 
2008 333,030 
2009 279,070 
2010 283,540 
2011 299,900 
2012 242,509 
2013 240,940 
2014 249,960 
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Source: data on population by Comuni-Italiani.it, computed on 31 December. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once again, the table demonstrates that China presents some differences. Summing up, the 
results obtained from the comparison among China, Pakistan and Morocco have highlighted 
that the Chinese living in Italy send huge amounts of remittances per head, which are even 
higher than their average annual wage, and the “curious thing” is that money transfers have 
increased just when the regular Chinese population in Italy has decreased. This trend is 
completely opposite to the other two cases: remittances to Pakistan and Morocco are much 
lower and the average amount per head does not exceed the average annual wage of Pakistani 
and Moroccans workers, even if these two communities have declared higher incomes than 
the Chinese in the last years.   
Imports from China are huge with respect to those from Pakistan and Morocco, and the 
highest amounts of imports have been recorded in the textile, leather and clothing sector. 
Given that these three segments exactly correspond to the industries in which most of Chinese 
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firms established in Italy operates, this fact may suggest that Chinese entrepreneurs continue 
addressing to suppliers working in their origin country and that the two parties conclude 
commercial transactions through money transfer agents in order to conceal these relations and 
avoid paying taxes and duties on imports. The hypothesis may be confirmed by the fact that 
most remittances outflows originated from areas and cities recording the highest number of 
Chinese enterprises. 
The most anomalous thing is that imports has changed proportionately to the economic cycle 
of those industries, but not to remittances. As I previously said, I may link this opposite trend 
to the fact that Chinese tried to get extra profits by conducting more illicit activities when the 
crisis hit harder and revenues were therefore lower. On the contrary, although remittances 
tend to move counter-cyclically, Pakistani and Moroccans lowered money transfers to their 
homelands in the years in which they suffered most from the economic crisis. 
Finally, one more confirmation of the fact that remittances to China are not usually devoted to 
family supporting is that the percentages of Chinese men and women living in Italy are almost 
equal, suggesting that families migrate together. On the contrary, those percentages differ 
much more for the Pakistani and the Moroccan, whose men migrants are used to migrate 
alone in search for a job, and send part of their income to their wives in order to provide them 
with economic support.  
In conclusion, it is quite evident that there is something more than family supporting behind 
remittances to China and it is very likely that at least part of the money remitted comes from 
illicit activities, which make the Chinese earn extra money. As confirmed by Guardia di 
Finanza investigations, money transfers are mainly related to commercial transactions with 
firms operating in China, which supply components to Chinese entrepreneurs operating in 
Italy; in addition, Bank of China’s branch in Milan reported that the chief destinations of the 
Chinese remittances are cities located in the South-East of China, which is a wealthy area and 
enjoy strategic positions thanks to the short distance from Hong Kong and Shanghai. The 
South-Eastern area has rapidly grown in the last decades and has developed an industrial 
district in which firms manufacture goods to be exported to Italy. Fake invoices and the sale 
of counterfeited goods are probably the most common practices and they may help explaining 
why most of times the remittances receivers are firms established in China and supplying 
merchandise to those in Italy. However, the huge amount of remittances does not often raise 
money laundering concerns since Chinese remitters tend to use fake Identity Documents and 
transfer money in tranches not exceeding the cash threshold imposed by the government. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis addresses three main topics highly connected to each other indeed broadly studied 
- i.e. remittances, underground banking, and money laundering. The works started with a 
general overview on these topics and reported the main steps in regulation changes against  
money laundering. 
 
Evidence shows that remittances are definitely vital for thousands of people and even for 
some countries’ economy, so the provision of remittance services is essential for reducing 
poverty (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). As I previously explained, most individuals living in poor 
countries (i.e. remittance receivers) do not have access to the conventional banking system 
because there are no branches in their area or they do not have ID documents; on the contrary, 
the parallel banking system allows those people to access financial services at low cost and it 
has therefore widely spread in countries recording high flows of worker expatriates and 
having inefficient financial sectors. On the other side, since the alternative banking channel is 
not subject to specific and strict regulation, it has been subject to abuses by criminals since 
long time (Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). Financial crime (i.e. money laundering) is the 
most common kind of offense carried out through the underground banking; therefore, in 
order to prevent money laundering practices through informal agents, authorities should 
promote the use of conventional banking systems to accomplish money transfers. 
Indeed, summing up what I wrote in the previous chapters, traditional banks are forced to 
implement stricter controls on customers’ identification and to record all the transactions, 
whose documentation is then preserved for some years. These rulings act as a deterrent for 
launderers, so, if banks played a greater role as remittance service providers, the negative 
effects of criminal activities on the real and financial economy would be much more 
restricted.   
In order to encourage the use of formal channels, it may be useful to compute the threshold 
that makes migrants indifferent between using the formal or informal channel: the lower the 
threshold, the more likely is the use of formal channels: 
a) Formal channel: Remittancef = money sent - total cost 
b) Informal channel: Remittanceinf= money sent - total cost 
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where total cost is a function of the exchange rate, the commission applied, the distance 
between the sender and the receiver, and the transportation costs related to the presence of 
branches in the receiver’s location: in case the receiver lives in a remote area where banks do 
not have branches, transportation costs to get to the bank may be quite relevant. 
By applying the formula above, money sent ceteris paribus,  
Remittances
f
>remittances
inf   
cost
f
<cost
inf
. 
Costs are therefore a prime factor in influencing the use of the formal or informal system. The 
economics literature always suggest to increase competition in order to reduce costs, so if 
more and more banks and Money Transfer Companies entered the remittance market, they 
would be forced to reduce costs and would therefore be more competitive with respect to 
Alternative Remittance Providers (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). Banks should hence continue 
developing the migrant banking business and make the service more accessible to foreign 
people.  
Besides offering cheaper services, underground bankers are normally chosen also for cultural 
reasons. Hawala and Fei ch’ien are the largest underground banking networks and were 
indeed born in areas having strong trust and network values, which lead them to address to 
people who they know. As migrants do not know banks’ employees, who most of time do not 
even speak the local language, it is hard to convince worker expatriates to address to formal 
bankers when transferring money abroad.  
The proposition above is confirmed by the description of money transfer activities from Italy 
to China reported in Chapter 5, which are accomplished by a network of agents mostly 
constituted by Chinese individuals. Authorities willing to reduce money laundering cases 
should take into account that the Chinese culture gives a high value to trust, and this is why 
the Chinese tend to address to people belonging to their network (guangxi); it would hence be 
very helpful to employ Chinese agents in formal Money Transfer Companies, and, in general, 
users’ compatriots. As for the Italy-China corridor, credit risk is almost null because small 
money transfers provide cash-to-bank services (i.e. cash payments at the counter), which are 
then electronically transferred to the Bank of China branch in Milan, and the receiver’s bank 
account is credited only when the money transfer agent gets the sum of money, which is 
transported to Milan by vans (Pieraccini, 2010). This mechanism definitely helps eliminating 
the credit risk but money transportation to the Bank of China’s branch may be quite costly if 
the originator lives far from Milan. On the contrary, official operators do not incur in 
transportation costs and this may be a point in their advantage. Since most of money transfers 
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to China are accomplished for commercial purposes (e.g. pay for imports), money is sent to 
industrialized zones of China where banks are likely to operate; in these cases, transportation 
costs related to remittances would be almost null and banks would result more convenient. 
Indeed, besides explaining why the Chinese address to individuals coming from their country 
to carry out money transfers, the Chinese culture is also responsible for the strict relationships 
between firms in China and those managed by Chinese but established in Italy. Each Chinese 
individual establishes personal relationships and creates his own network made up of friends 
and relatives, from which he/she will never isolate. The collectivist behavior is one of the 
reasons why most of the Chinese living in Italy come from the same provinces, know each 
other and locate close one to the other when moving abroad (Shehu, 2004). Anyway, the main 
problem related to outflows to China remains that money transferred for commercial purposes 
comes from or is devoted to illicit activities (Fondazione Icsa, 2012). In order to appear more 
reliable, wholesale Italian firms should therefore try to establish partnership with Chinese 
firms established in China and become suppliers of the Chinese companies established in 
Italy; hiring one or more Chinese employees may also be very helpful to take care of 
interaction and relationships with Chinese partners, so that the latter would reduce their risk 
aversion towards foreigners’ firms. The partnerships and supplying relationships between 
Italian and Chinese firms may help reducing the cases of money laundering involving the 
concealment of export payments. Still, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, customs controls in Italy 
have not been enough severe for long time, so it may be helpful to carry out stricter controls. 
After comparing the remittances flows to China with those towards Pakistan and Morocco, it 
is clear that the money laundering issues arising in the Italy-China corridor are exacerbated by 
the recent and weak Anti-Money Laundering regulation in China. Indeed, China, Pakistan and 
Morocco are developing countries, and may hence experience the same matters in terms of 
corruption and so on; however, China presents some specific features which definitely 
incentivize money laundering practices; among them: the benefits enjoyed by the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and the presence of many Free Trade Zones allow firms to 
circumvent taxes and other requirements which would negatively influence firms’ profits. 
Moreover, the Chinese have always tended to conceal both their identities (fake passports 
have been traditionally used by this population) and their money, meaning that they try 
avoiding disclosing their wealth; these two habits make it even more difficult to solve the 
problem (Shehu, 2004; Asian Banker White Paper, 2009). 
The Chinese case is a great example of criminal activities accomplished through the 
underground banking system. In conclusion, in order to make the formal banking system 
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prevail on the unofficial one, more actions are definitely needed; anyway, it would be 
desirable that those arrangements did not consist only in strict regulation on informal agents, 
but rather in imitating the way of operating of underground bankers while still trying to 
prevent and deter criminal activities. Besides increasing collaboration among international 
authorities aimed at achieving a better prevention of abuses, reducing the bureaucratic burden 
of official providers (while still allowing customers’ identification and transactions recording) 
would translate into more efficient and quicker services that would result more attractive for 
users. Proper policies should also aim at helping potential Remittance Service Providers to 
enter the market by exploiting new technologies as well as helping potential and actual users 
to have a deeper knowledge of the functioning and the services that they can enjoy. In 
addition, since irregular migrants do not own any ID document and they are therefore denied 
to access to conventional bank and Money Transfer Companies, it is certainly necessary that 
MT providers set up an alternative identification systems for irregular migrants.  
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